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Abstract 
Several studies have examined the ability of the Rey 15-Item Memory Test 
(MFIT) to identify malingering of memory problems among a variety of psychiatric 
and neurologically impaired populations.  The consensus has been that the quantitative 
scoring method is overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment and lacks 
sensitivity to simulated amnesia.  However, a reexamination of these studies and 
available data indicates the MFIT is both valid and effective at identifying actual 
malingerers among civil litigants, and a number of these studies were limited through 
inappropriate inclusion of severely impaired patients and research designs of 
questionable validity.  Also, the performance of a group for whom malingering of 
memory complaints is a relevant issue (criminal defendants) has been overlooked.  
The present study expands upon previous investigations by comparing the MFIT 
performance of a known group of forensic malingerers to a group of non-malingering 
pretrial criminal defendants and non-malingering post-trial forensic inpatients, and by 
examining the utility of a qualitative scoring approach hypothesized to enhance the 
MFIT’s detection ability. 
Using the quantitative method, a low sensitivity of 47.7% was obtained for 
malingerers.  Minimal improvement was found when qualitative scoring was 
incorporated (56.8%), although confidence in correct identification was increased with 
very low total scores (<5) and failure to recall at least 3 of the first 6 items.  While the 
quantitative method yielded high specificity for non-malingering post-trial patients 
(86.7%), this was not the case for the more clinically relevant non-malingering pretrial 
patients (56.2%).  However, specificity was increased for both non-malingering 
groups through the addition of qualitative scoring.  Although both the quantitative and 
 vii 
combined quantitative and qualitative scoring methods were found to be accurate at 
identifying criminal forensic malingerers, neither was found to be more accurate than 
base rate prediction alone.  It is concluded that the lack of effectiveness can be 
attributed to 1) decreased sensitivity to less blatant forms of malingering, and 2) the 
adverse impact of lower intelligence and psychiatric symptoms affecting the ability to 
attend and organize cognitive processes on the MFIT recall for actual patients. 
 1
Introduction 
 Malingering is defined as the “intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives 
such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, 
evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 1994).  It is recognized that a variety of somatic (e.g., chronic pain), 
psychiatric (e.g., psychosis), and neurocognitive (e.g., amnesia, low intelligence) 
symptoms are susceptible to being feigned (Main & Spanswick, 1995; Resnick, 1993; 
Schretlen, Van Gorp, Wilkins, & Bobholz, 1992).  Given the potential losses to 
society for successful malingering, conservatively estimated to be a $5.36 billion 
annual cost in the U.S.A. (Gouvier, Lees-Haley, & Hammer, in press), it is not 
surprising that a great amount of effort has gone into the clinical identification of 
malingerers.  One method has been in the use of existing psychological assessment 
instruments, for example using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI) to detect feigning of chronic pain (Dush, Simons, Platt, Nation, & Ayres, 
1994).  Another method has involved the development of new instruments specifically 
for the detection of malingering, with examples including the M-Test (Beaber, 
Marston, Michelli, & Mills, 1985) and Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms 
(SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) to detect feigned psychosis, and the Dot 
Counting Test (DCT; Rey, 1941) to detect feigned neurocognitive impairment. 
Neuropsychologists have been increasingly called upon to evaluate for 
malingering within legal settings (Bernard, 1990).  Among civil litigants and disability 
claimants, the prevalence for malingering of cognitive deficits has been noted to vary 
widely, with estimates ranging between 15 to 64% (Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 
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1994; Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993).  Within criminal forensic settings, prevalence 
estimates for the malingering of psychosis and associated cognitive deficits are within 
a narrower range.  Rogers (1986) provided a prevalence estimate of 4.5% for definite 
malingering and 20% for suspected malingering among criminal defendants being 
evaluated for insanity.  A survey of 320 highly experienced forensic experts (Rogers, 
Sewell, & Goldstein, 1994) found that 15.7% of forensic evaluatees were classified as 
malingering, and a more recent survey of 221 forensic experts yielded a similar 
estimate of 17.4% (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998). 
 Amnesia is one of the more frequently malingered neuropsychological 
symptoms among both civil and criminal litigants.  However, the simulation of 
chronic organic amnesia (e.g., severe anterograde amnesia due to traumatic brain 
injury) has typically been associated with compensation litigation, whereas the 
simulation of limited forms of amnesia (i.e., amnesia specific to the crime itself) has 
been more frequently associated with criminal cases (Schacter, 1986a).  For example, 
in a review of legal cases, Schacter (1986b) noted that between 30 to 65% of 
individuals convicted of homicide claimed limited amnesia for the crime.  Moreover, 
he noted there was no case in which an individual with chronic organic amnesia had 
come before the court on a serious criminal matter. 
 This was corroborated by Rubinsky and Brandt (1986), who found no case in 
which amnesia, in and of itself, was determined to have rendered an individual 
incompetent to stand trial or to have negated criminal responsibility.  Rather, 
simulated amnesia is typically seen as part of insanity pleas.  As Rubinsky and Brandt 
noted, several state courts have held the position that “amnesia is sometimes an 
incident of insanity” (p. 30).  This is consistent with current research, which has 
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shown that individuals with certain psychiatric conditions (e.g., schizophrenia, major 
depression) have associated cognitive deficits involving memory and attention (e.g., 
Malloy & Duffy, 1994).  As such, pretrial criminal defendants have been noted to 
malinger psychosis and associated cognitive impairment in order to be found 
incompetent to stand trial, demonstrate diminished criminal responsibility, obtain an 
insanity verdict, or to mitigate sentencing (Gothard, Rogers, & Sewell, 1995; Resnick, 
1997; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Schacter, 1986a; 1986b). 
 The consensus in the legal community is that memory impairment is easily 
faked, yet almost impossible to disprove (Wiggins & Brandt, 1988).  However, there is 
a paucity of empirical investigation substantiating this position with respect to 
criminal defendants.  Nonetheless, several investigators offer encouragement that 
criminal defendants attempting to malinger memory impairment may be identifiable 
through existing neuropsychological and malingering measures.  For example, Rogers 
and Cruise (1998) postulated these individuals are more likely to be extreme in their 
presentations, given that only grossly psychotic (and thus cognitively impaired) 
presentations have a good probability of achieving the proper goal.  This is especially 
relevant for individuals accused of violent crimes (e.g., homicide), who have more at 
stake in terms of being convicted and thus more likely to overplay their role (Schacter, 
1986a).  Furthermore, these contentions should be considered within the context of 
common erroneous perceptions about amnesia.  For example, Iverson (1995) found 
that individuals instructed to simulate amnesia would often fake total amnesia (i.e., 
personal information, mother’s maiden name), and 10% stated they would completely 
forget presented material.  Also, laypersons often do not distinguish between the 
etiologically distinct amnestic disorders, and thus are more likely to present with 
 4
inconsistent symptoms (e.g., severe retrograde amnesia in conjunction with mild head 
injury) (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Wiggins & 
Brandt, 1988). 
 Despite the finding that criminal defendants are likely to simulate limited as 
opposed to chronic amnesia, Schacter (1986a) acknowledged these individuals may 
also simulate memory impairment on current assessments to further substantiate their 
claims.  Still, other confounds must be considered.  Individuals already having a 
psychiatric condition and cognitive deficits may simply exaggerate existing 
impairment, making the task of separating true deficits far more difficult (Pachana, 
Boone, & Ganzell, 1998).  As pointed out by Hayes, Hilsabeck, and Gouvier (1999), it 
is not uncommon for attorneys to coach their clients with regard to psychological and 
neuropsychological assessments.  Likewise, malingerers may receive factual 
information from a variety of sources (i.e., other patients, health care professionals), as 
well as having prior legal and assessment experiences, which could contribute to more 
sophisticated presentations. 
 Thus, while it is possible that criminal defendants who attempt to malinger 
problems with memory can be identified with existing assessments, the presence of 
potential confounds makes consistently accurate identification difficult.  Rogers, 
Harrell, and Liff (1993) have identified six systematic strategies that may prove useful 
for improving the detection of feigning.  These include (1) the “performance curve” 
strategy, which assumes that malingerers will not consider item difficulty in choosing 
which questions to fail (i.e., failing easy items while passing more difficult ones).  A 
more commonly employed strategy known as (2) “symptom validity testing” involves 
presenting items with two forced-choice alternatives, with the assumption that 
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malingerers will fail the items at a below-chance level of performance (i.e., only 
getting 10% of the items right whereas one would get 50% right by randomly 
guessing).  The (3) “magnitude of error” strategy simply assumes there will be 
qualitative differences between malingerers and bona fide patients in the types of 
wrong responses made.  Two similar strategies which have received little empirical 
focus include (4) “atypical (symptom) presentation” and (5) “psychological sequelae” 
(i.e., the presence of psychological symptoms not typically associated with a given 
neurological insult). 
The final method is referred to by Rogers et al. (1993) as (6) the “floor effect” 
strategy, which assumes the individual attempting to malinger will fail at a task which 
even grossly impaired individuals are likely to perform adequately.  This has relevance 
for forensic malingering evaluations, given the presumption that individuals 
attempting to feign insanity are more likely to overplay their role in an effort to appear 
more disturbed (Resnick, 1997; Rogers & Cruise, 1998).  One such measure, the Rey 
Fifteen-Item Memory Test (Rey, 1964), has been the focus of empirical investigations 
for more than a decade. 
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The Rey Fifteen-Item Memory Test 
 In 1964, Andre Rey described a screening measure designed to detect memory 
malingering.  Although never formally named by Rey, it has been referred to as the 
“Rey Memory Test” (Goldberg & Miller, 1986), the “Rey 15-Item Memory Test” 
(Back et al., 1996), and “Rey’s 15-Item Visual Memory Test” (Arnett, Hammeke, & 
Schwartz, 1995).  For purposes of clarity, Rey’s measure will be referred to 
throughout the remainder of this text as the “Memory for Fifteen Items Test” (MFIT), 
which is its most commonly used name (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Hayes, Hale, & 
Gouvier, 1998).  The MFIT is a measure of immediate span of apprehension (i.e., 
short-term memory) (Leng & Parkin, 1995).  It consists of an 8.5” x 11” card on which 
are printed 15 items (letters, numbers, and shapes) arranged in 3 columns and 5 rows 
(Appendix A).  The examinee is told there are 15 different (emphasized) items to 
remember, which are to be reproduced immediately on a blank sheet of paper 
following a 10-second exposure to the stimulus card.  Although it is presented as a 
difficult task, it is actually quite simple because there is redundancy among items that 
reduces the amount of information to be remembered (i.e., three main ideas).  Thus, 
the MFIT relies upon the floor effect strategy for detecting malingering (Rogers et al., 
1993), which assumes the naive malingerer will be misled into overplaying their role 
and choose to perform poorly on this very simple task. 
 Immediate memory span is an aspect of memory typically preserved, even in 
individuals with severe organic amnesia (Leng & Parkin, 1995).  Although the 
assumption underlying the MFIT has intuitive appeal, empirical investigation is 
necessary to demonstrate validity and effectiveness for this purpose.  Rogers et al. 
(1993) described three study designs through which this can be accomplished.  
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“Simulation designs” are analogue studies which involve instructing normal subjects 
to feign (simulate) a particular disorder, the performance of which can then be 
compared to that of individuals with the disorder.  In a “known-groups” design, the 
performance of actual malingerers (identified by independent clinicians) is compared 
to that of individuals with and without the given disorder.  Finally,  “differential 
prevalence” designs involve making comparisons with a group assumed to be 
malingering based solely upon the context of the evaluation (i.e., presumption that 
individuals seeking compensation for head injury are more likely to malinger 
neuropsychological sequela). 
 In the following sections, empirical investigations from each of these 
categories, as well as strictly normative studies of the MFIT, will be examined.  
Particular emphasis will be placed on the instrument’s sensitivity (i.e., percentage of 
malingerers correctly identified) and specificity (i.e., percentage of non-malingering 
patients correctly identified).  This will be followed by an examination of the validity 
and effectiveness of the MFIT in detecting malingered memory deficits among various 
populations, in addition to the improved prospects offered through an alternative 
qualitative scoring method.  Finally, the present study will be presented and these 
issues discussed in relation to use of the MFIT among pre- and post-trial forensic 
inpatients. 
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Definition of Statistical Terms 
 Before discussing investigations of the MFIT, a definition of the statistical 
concepts to be used throughout the remainder of the text is in order.  Cutoff scores are 
often used with psychological tests to make decisions concerning the presence or 
absence of a given condition.  Using the MFIT and malingering status as an example, 
scores falling below the cutoff of nine items are assumed to indicate malingering, 
whereas scores at or above the cutoff are assumed to not be indicative of malingering.  
A “true positive” occurs when an individual who is malingering is correctly identified 
as malingering by their test performance (falling below the cutoff); the perentage of 
true positives is referred to as the sensitivity of the test.  Conversely, a “true negative” 
occurs when an individual who is not malingering is correctly identified as such.  The 
percentage of true negatives is known as the specificity of the test.  When an 
individual who is not malingering is incorrectly classified as malingering by the test, a 
false positive (Type I error) is said to occur, whereas a “false negative” or Type II 
error occurs when a malingerer is misclassified as not malingering.  An illustration of 
these concepts is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Classification Table for the MFIT 
Actual Condition  
Predicted Condition 
(based on MFIT scores) Malingering Not Malingering 
Malingering
(less than 9 items)
True Positive 
(Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
(Type I Error) 
Not Malingering
(9 or more items)
False Negative 
(Type II Error) 
True Negative 
(Specificity) 
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Gouvier, Hayes, and Smiroldo (1998), citing Faust and Nurcombe (1989), 
recommended a useful strategy for determining if a test is a valid and effective 
indicator of malingering.  A test is considered a valid (accurate) indicator if the 
sensitivity divided by the false negative error rate exceeds the false positive error rate 
divided by the specificity.  If a measure is an effective indicator (i.e., more accurate 
than the base rate), the base rate for the condition (i.e., number of malingerers divided 
by the total population) will be greater than the combined error rate (false positive + 
false negative) for the instrument.  However, in situations where the base rate exceeds 
50%, the equation for determining effectiveness becomes (1 – base rate > false 
positive + false negative).  An important point is that while a test may be valid, it may 
still not be an effective indicator. 
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Normative Studies 
 It was first suggested by Lezak (1976) that a cutoff of less than nine items 
(three rows) correctly recalled on the MFIT be used in suspecting malingering, as only 
“significantly deteriorated patients” would recall fewer items.  However, this 
suggestion was apparently based upon clinical observations rather than empirical fact.  
It was not until 10 years later that the first empirical investigation of the MFIT was 
conducted.  In an effort to establish normative data, Goldberg and Miller (1986) 
examined the performance of 50 acutely disturbed psychiatric inpatients and 16 
mentally retarded individuals on the MFIT.  While none of the psychiatric inpatients 
fell below the suggested cutoff of nine items, 37.5% of the mentally retarded sample 
did.  Furthermore, the authors recommended using the total number of items correct, 
as a greater number of individuals in both groups failed to meet the 3-row criterion.  
These findings raised an important issue regarding the influence of intellect on MFIT 
performance, as none of the psychiatric inpatients had IQ estimates in the mentally 
retarded range (mean IQ of 101.1, range of 70 to 123). 
 While the study of Goldberg and Miller (1986) offered some utility in 
investigating Lezak’s (1976) claim pertaining to “significantly deteriorated”, it failed 
to examine the MFIT with respect to a population with demonstrated memory 
impairment.  Assuming that individuals feigning memory impairment would most 
likely attempt to imitate individuals with brain damage, Bernard and Fowler (1990) 
investigated the MFIT with 18 predominately diffuse head injury patients with 
significant memory impairment (M time postinjury = 18.9 weeks) and 16 normal 
controls.  Using the 9-item cutoff, it was found that 11.2% of the patients with head 
injuries would have been incorrectly suspected of malingering (i.e., specificity of 
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88.8%), as compared to none of the controls.  However, the authors noted that 
lowering the cutoff to less than eight items correctly recalled resulted in none of the 
head-injured patients being incorrectly classified; they subsequently recommended 
using this more conservative score. 
 Morgan (1991) conducted a normative study to establish the effect of true 
memory impairment on MFIT performance.  The MFIT was administered to 60 
neurology patients, none of whom were involved in litigation or disability 
proceedings, along with measures of new learning ability and memory.  The sample 
consisted primarily of individuals with alcoholic encephalopathy and probable 
dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, and all subjects were tested (where relevant) at a 
minimum of 1-month postinsult (e.g., after encephalitis or termination of alcohol 
consumption).  Morgan found that 12 patients (20%) failed to achieve the criterion of 
at least nine figures correctly recalled (M=5.4).  A closer inspection of the data 
revealed that among those failing the MFIT, 92% obtained average memory 
impairment ratings in the severe to profound range, and the MFIT failure participants 
were significantly older.  Morgan additionally noted there was no greater sensitivity of 
MFIT performance to verbal or nonverbal memory impairment, as the majority of 
subjects demonstrated global impairment.  Morgan concluded that Lezak’s (1976) 
claim regarding significantly deteriorated was supported, as only individuals with the 
most severe memory impairment failed to achieve the suggested cutoff. 
 Based upon the findings of Goldberg and Miller (1986) concerning the 
influence of intellect on MFIT performance, Hays, Emmons, and Lawson (1993) 
sought to provide ability-based norms for this measure.  Among a sample of 300 adult 
psychiatric inpatients, it was found that IQ and age correlated highly with the total 
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number of items recalled on the MFIT  (r=.60 and -.29, respectively), which taken 
together accounted for 43% of the variance in MFIT scores.  Although the 
investigators failed to mention the diagnostic makeup of their sample, it was noted that 
72 % of individuals with an IQ lower than 65 fell below the 9-item cutoff.  This is 
almost double the number of subjects falling below the cutoff in the Goldberg and 
Miller (1986) study, who had an average IQ of 63.4 (range between 40 and 69). 
 A more recent normative investigation of the MFIT was conducted by Back et 
al. (1996).  Under the premise that individuals feigning psychosis often feign cognitive 
impairment as well, Back et al. examined the performance of 30 individuals with 
schizophrenia on the MFIT.  Using the 9-item cutoff, they found that 13% of the 
sample would have been incorrectly suspected of malingering.  A regression analysis 
revealed MFIT performance to be unrelated to patients’ mental and psychiatric status 
(as determined through performance on the Mini-Mental State Examination and 
ratings on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale), although education accounted for 37% 
of the variance in scores. 
 With the exception of the study by Morgan (1991), a major shortcoming 
common to normative studies has been the assumption that participants had no 
incentive(s) for feigning/exaggerating their complaints (e.g., gaining staff attention, 
acquiring better services, etc.).  Nonetheless, they provide evidence that the specificity 
of the MFIT is compromised by one’s level of intellect, particularly when intellectual 
deficiency is superimposed upon a psychiatric condition.  Furthermore, individuals 
with severe memory impairment do perform below the suggested cutoff at a rather 
high rate.  The MFIT therefore appears to be of limited utility in detecting 
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feigning/exaggeration of memory complaints among individuals with an established 
history of psychiatric impairment or intellectual deficiency. 
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Simulation Design Studies 
 The first study of the MFIT using a simulation design was conducted by 
Bernard (1990).  Using a sample of college students, the performance of a control 
group was compared to that of a group instructed to “fake believable memory 
impairments” without financial incentive, and a group instructed to fake memory 
impairment with a financial incentive, across multiple measures of memory.  No 
differences were found between groups in the total number of items recalled on the 
MFIT, and it is noted that the average scores for the two simulating groups (13.2 and 
13.3, respectively) were well above the suggested cutoff.  Bernard contended that this 
finding might have resulted from the placement of the MFIT at the end of a battery 
that contained more difficult tests, thus making the intent of the measure more 
obvious.  He suggested the MFIT be placed at the beginning of test batteries to avoid 
compromising the test’s detection ability.  This contention was confirmed in a 
subsequent study by Bernard, Houston, and Natoli (1993).  By placing the MFIT at the 
beginning of the battery, it was found that a group of college students simulating 
memory impairment recalled significantly fewer items than a group of controls.  
Although the authors noted the average number of items recalled by the simulated 
malingerers (M=10.0) remained above the suggested cutoff, an inspection of the tables 
reveals this group did recall fewer correct rows (M=2.2) than the recommended 3-row 
cutoff. 
 Schretlen, Brandt, Kraft, and Van Gorp (1991) conducted a more extensive 
study using two groups of simulators.  In the first group, community volunteers and 
college students were instructed to feign either psychogenic amnesia, amnesia due to 
head trauma, or amnesia of unspecified etiology.  The second simulating group was 
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composed of inpatients with substance abuse problems given instructions to feign 
“insanity.”  The performance of simulators was compared to that of 80 normal 
controls and a variety of patients including 10 amnesics with “severe” memory 
problems, 55 patients with a history of  “moderately severe” traumatic brain injury 
(TBI), 9 patients with dementia (primarily Huntington’s disease), 34 patients with 
severe mental illness (i.e., schizophrenia), 40 patients with a variety of 
neuropsychiatric diagnoses, and 7 civil litigants under suspicion of malingering 
memory complaints.  It was found that the genuine amnesics, severe psychiatric 
patients, and individuals suspected of malingering recalled significantly fewer items 
than individuals simulating amnesia.  No differences were found between normal 
controls, patients with TBI, and normals simulating amnesia, although the patients 
simulating insanity were found to recall significantly fewer items than the normal 
controls.  None of the simulators fell below the 9-item cutoff. 
Using the 9-item cutoff, a sensitivity of 0% was found for the normals 
simulating various forms of amnesia and 36% for patients simulating insanity.  
Comparatively, the sensitivity for the group suspected of malingering was 43%.  
While it is possible the performance of the two simulating groups was affected by the 
failure of the experimenters to provide detailed scenarios, this finding does bring into 
question the effects of simulating different conditions as well as the validity of using 
college students in simulation studies. 
In terms of specificity, Schretlen et al. (1991) found that 73% of all patients 
combined fell above the 9-item cutoff.  From this and the comparatively lower 
performance of the amnesics, the authors concluded that the MFIT lacked adequate 
specificity and was overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment.  However, the 
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use of groups of widely disparate sizes (some with very low Ns) and failure to make 
statistical corrections for experiment wide error (i.e., comparisons between 9 groups 
using three dependent measures) violates statistical assumptions and brings into 
question the validity of these findings. 
 A simulation design study by Guilmette, Hart, Giuliano, and Leininger (1994) 
examined the efficacy of the MFIT in relation to an abbreviated version of the Hiscock 
Forced-Choice Procedure (A-HFCP).  Participants included 20 inpatients in a brain 
injury rehabilitation hospital, 20 psychiatric inpatients with a predominant diagnosis of 
Major Depression, and 20 college students instructed to “fake believable memory 
deficits.”  Guilmette et al. found that the brain-injured subjects recalled significantly 
fewer items on the MFIT than both the simulated malingerers and psychiatric patients.  
Furthermore, 45% of the brain-injured subjects fell below the 9-item cutoff, as 
compared to only 15% of the simulated malingerers.  In contrast, none of the brain-
injured subjects and only 5% of the psychiatric patients were misclassified on the A-
HFCP, and 85% of the simulated malingerers were correctly detected.  While these 
results appear dismal for the MFIT, it is noted the brain-injured subjects consisted 
primarily of individuals who suffered from cerebrovascular accidents or head injuries, 
and who demonstrated moderate to severe cognitive deficits on a variety of 
neuropsychological tests (including memory).  This is an important point to consider, 
given the claims of Lezak (1976). 
 Using an expanded scoring system incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, Arnett et al. (1995) conducted a two-part study comparing the 
performance of simulators (college students) with that of neurological patients on the 
MFIT.  In the first phase, the performance of undergraduates was compared to a mixed 
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neurological sample consisting primarily of closed head injury with intracerebral 
hemorrhage, cerebrovascular accident, and brain tumor cases (M time since injury = 
1.67 years).  It was found that undergraduate simulators recalled significantly fewer 
correct rows in proper sequence, correct rows in any sequence, and total items in the 
correct location than neurological patients.  However, there was no difference between 
simulators and patients in term of the number of correct items regardless of location 
(which is the common scoring method), and it is noted the average number of items 
recalled by the simulators was 12.1 (SD=2.6).  Using the 9-item cutoff, sensitivity was 
found to be 63% and specificity 74%; these numbers changed minimally when using 
8- and 7-item cutoffs.  Arnett et al. concluded from this phase of the study that less 
than two correct rows in proper location be used as the cutoff, as this yielded an 
improved specificity of 97% (sensitivity = 47%). 
 The second phase of the Arnett et al. (1995) study was an attempt to replicate 
the findings of the first phase using a similar group of neurological patients and “more 
sophisticated” simulators (i.e., medical students).  The same pattern of results 
emerged, and using the 9-item cutoff a similar rate of sensitivity and specificity was 
found (76% and 80%, respectively).  The authors concluded the number of correct 
rows in proper location was the best discriminator, as only two neurological patients in 
the entire sample were misidentified. 
 Although the Arnett et al. (1995) study was beneficial in providing evidence 
that individuals with traumatic brain injury can perform adequately on the MFIT, 
certain limitations are worth noting.  First, simulators were only instructed to 
exaggerate problems with brain damage, rather than specifically feign memory 
impairment.  This may account for the findings of low sensitivity when using the 
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recommended cutoff.  Moreover, simulators were tested in a group format and using 
only the MFIT, which the authors acknowledged may have affected the results.  
Second, the authors noted that four of the neurological subjects were not fully oriented 
to person, place, and time.  While this may be indicative of significant cognitive 
impairment, no specific mention is made to their performance on the MFIT, thus their 
potential contribution to lowered specificity.  Furthermore, the authors mentioned that 
all patients received a full neuropsychological battery, yet failed to report on the level 
of performance of this group.  As such, it is unknown what the actual level of 
functioning was for this group (except that they all had IQ’s above 70), which limits 
the conclusions to be drawn from this study regarding neurological impairment and 
MFIT performance. 
 Two major findings have emerged from simulation design studies of the MFIT.  
First, nearly all of these studies used samples of college students to simulate the 
performance of malingerers.  While an advantage in this procedure is increased 
experimental control, it comes at the expense of external validity.  Rogers et al. (1993) 
noted that it is unknown as to what extent the performance of these groups generalizes 
to that of malingerers in real-world settings.   As Rogers and Cruise (1998) 
discovered, factors such as appreciation for negative incentives (i.e., consequences for 
unsuccessful feigning), ability to identify with the scenario, and relevance to 
participants can affect response styles.  Given that these factors are often not 
incorporated into simulation studies, the validity of findings from these studies is 
questionable.  This may explain the widely discrepant findings of sensitivity among 
these studies, i.e., 0% in Schretlen et al. (1991) to 76% in Arnett et al. (1995).  Other 
noted confounds include variations in the amount of detail provided in scenarios, 
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disorders participants were instructed to feign (i.e., memory deficits vs. insanity), 
administration format (i.e., group vs. individual, beginning vs. end of test battery), and 
educational differences between simulators and patient controls.  As such, estimates of 
sensitivity derived from simulation studies should be considered cautiously. 
 The second major finding from simulation studies of the MFIT comes in the 
form of additional normative data.  Specifically, these studies provided further 
evidence that individuals with established neurological and psychiatric conditions 
resulting in severe cognitive impairment have greater difficulty in “passing” the MFIT 
than those individuals with less severe impairments.  In keeping with Lezak’s (1976) 
claim regarding “significantly deteriorated” individuals, the findings of low specificity 
among such populations is not unexpected.  It could therefore be argued that it would 
be more appropriate to examine the specificity for such populations separate from that 
of individuals with less severe deficits, as these are the individuals malingerers are 
most likely to imitate (e.g., Greiffenstein et al., 1996; Iverson, 1995). 
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Differential Prevalence Designs 
 There have only been two studies examining performance on the MFIT using a 
differential prevalence design.  The first of these was conducted by Lee, Loring, and 
Martin (1992), who compared the MFIT performance of 100 inpatients with temporal 
lobe epilepsy (TLE), 40 outpatients with neurological disorders not involved in 
litigation, and 16 individuals with neurological disorders involved in litigation.  TLE 
patients had demonstrated memory impairment (less than 5th percentile) on at least 
one of four standardized memory tests, and were not involved in litigation.  The non-
litigating outpatient sample was comprised of a variety of neurological disorders (e.g., 
tumor, closed head injury), whereas the outpatients involved in litigation were 
predominately cases of mild closed head injury.  Analyses revealed no differences in 
the total number of MFIT items recalled between TLE patients and non-litigating 
outpatients.  However, both groups were found to recall significantly more items than 
the litigating outpatient group.  Lee et al. recommended using a cutoff of seven or 
fewer items, as this yielded the best overall sensitivity and specificity. 
 A closer inspection of the Lee et al. (1992) study reveals a problem with the 
reported sensitivity and specificity.  Instead of reporting values for a 9-item cutoff, the 
authors report values for an 8-item cutoff.  In examining the data provided in their 
tables, use of the 9-item cutoff would produce a specificity of 93% for both the TLE 
and non-litigating outpatient groups, compared to a sensitivity of 32.5% for the 
litigating outpatients.  Specificity changed minimally when using the recommended 7-
item cutoff (i.e., 96% for TLE, 95% for non-litigating outpatients), and there was no 
change in sensitivity for the litigating outpatients.  This small amount of change hardly 
warrants a recommendation for changing cutoff scores.  Moreover, a cutoff of six 
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items would have been even more accurate, as no patient in their study obtained a 
score below 7 items.  Nonetheless, the finding of high levels of specificity are 
encouraging, as Lee et al. noted the TLE patients with impaired memory were selected 
on the basis that their pathology almost always affects structures underlying new 
learning.  Thus, there is evidence from a large sample that individuals with memory 
impairment can perform quite well on the MFIT. 
 In the other study using a differential prevalence design (Griffin, Normington, 
& Glassmire, 1996), the authors compared two groups with “no incentive” to malinger 
(i.e., permanently psychiatrically disabled individuals and “normals” from community 
programs) with a group of “possible malingerers” (i.e., individuals filing 
psychological disability claims).  It was found that 19.8% of the possible malingerers 
fell below the 9-item cutoff, as compared to only 9.4% of the normals.  Problematic 
was the finding that a higher percentage of the permanently disabled group (28.3%) 
fell below the recommended cutoff. 
 Rogers et al. (1993) noted an intrinsic problem with differential prevalence 
designs is the assumption that the context of the evaluation results in dissimilar rates 
of feigning (i.e., individuals in litigation are more likely to be malingering).  It is 
virtually impossible to identify true prevalence rates for malingering from these 
designs, given no other objective criteria for malingering are used.  Moreover, these 
studies often overlook the possibility that individuals with “no incentive” for 
malingering based on a given criterion (e.g., non-litigating status) do not have other 
incentives for malingering (e.g., avoidance of responsibility) (Greiffenstein et al., 
1994).  This is best exemplified when the results of the Lee et al. (1992) study are 
compared with those of Arnett et al. (1995).  Specifically, Arnett et al. examined the 
 22
MFIT performance of their neurological patient group with respect to the patients’ 
litigation status.  No significant differences were found on any of the MFIT indices 
under investigation between patients in litigation and those not in litigation; moreover, 
the authors noted there was a trend for the patients in litigation to actually perform 
better.  This stands in contrast to the inferior performance of the litigating outpatients 
in the Lee et al. study, from which it can be concluded that estimates of sensitivity 
from differential prevalence studies are quite variable and potentially unreliable. 
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Known-Groups Designs 
 To date, five studies have examined the MFIT using a known-groups design.  
In an effort to improve upon previous designs, Greiffenstein et al. (1994) devised 
objective criteria (i.e., improbable outcomes for mild head injury) for identifying a 
group of individuals with persistent postconcussive syndrome (PPCS) with high 
likelihood of malingering.  Criteria included improbable poor performance (> -3 SD) 
on two or more neuropsychological measures, contradiction between collateral sources 
and symptom history, total disability in a major social role after one year, and claims 
of remote memory loss.  Mildly head injured PPCS patients who met two or more of 
these criteria were classified as probable malingerers (N=43).  Their performance was 
compared to that of 33 neuropsychological referrals with severe TBI (i.e., comatose 
admission status with medical instability), and 30 referrals with mild head injury and 
PPCS but no objective malingering markers.  Comparisons were made across several 
measures of memory, including the MFIT.  It was found that the probable malingerers 
recalled significantly fewer correct items on the MFIT than both the severe TBI and 
mild head injury with PPCS groups. 
 With regard to sensitivity and specificity, 62% of probable malingerers were 
correctly classified using a cutoff of nine items, whereas a specificity of 88% was 
found for TBI patients and 93% for PPCS patients.  Although the sensitivity of 62% 
was not significantly greater than Greiffenstein et al.’s (1994) estimated base rate of 
59% for probable malingering, they noted that this estimate may have been inflated 
due to referral source bias (i.e., majority of the mild head injury clients were referrals 
from insurance companies and attorneys).  As such, the authors stated a more 
reasonable estimate of base rates for malingering among PPCS clients lies in the range 
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of 33 to 60%.  Whereas the findings of specificity are encouraging, all of the cases 
studied were “a number of years” postinjury, which limits the generalizations one can 
draw to more acute cases. 
 Based upon the findings that criminal defendants often claim amnesia to either 
prove incompetence or escape criminal responsibility, Simon (1994) conducted an 
examination of the MFIT among non-retarded forensic inpatients.  The experimental 
group was comprised of 14 male pretrial defendants who had been given a diagnosis 
of malingering by the staffing team, using a wide range of information sources 
(excluding the MFIT) and in accordance with DSM-III-R criteria (APA, 1987).  The 
performance of this group was compared to a control group of 14 forensic inpatients 
with serious mental illness.  All of the control subjects had been legally declared “Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity” (NGBRI), and thus were assumed to have no incentive 
to malinger.  Using the recommended 9-item cutoff, it was found that 85.7% of both 
groups were correctly classified.  Using the recommended 3-row cutoff, sensitivity 
increased to 100%, although this came at the expense of reducing specificity to an 
unacceptable 43%. 
 Aside from the relatively small number of subjects studied, Simon (1994) 
noted some factors that may have affected his findings.  First, it was noted that all of 
the suspected malingerers were rather extreme in their presentations.  Thus, lower 
rates of sensitivity would be expected among more sophisticated malingerers and 
those attempting to feign more subtle deficits.  Second, the control group consisted of 
patients with chronic psychosis and/or dementia.  Although the average IQ for controls 
was 90, it was still significantly correlated with the total number of items recalled 
(r=.72).  Thus, lower specificity is not unexpected when one takes into consideration 
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the demonstrated combined effects of psychiatric illness and intellectual functioning 
on MFIT performance (Hays et al., 1993).  This was further demonstrated in a known-
groups investigation by Hayes, Hale, and Gouvier (1997), who found that non-
malingering mentally retarded forensic inpatients performed worse than mentally 
retarded pretrial defendants diagnosed with malingering across several standard 
malingering measures (including the MFIT). 
 Millis and Kler (1995) used below chance performance on a forced-choice 
symptom validity test (Recognition Word Memory Test [RMT]; Warrington, 1984) to 
identify a group of “clinical malingerers” from among a sample of individuals 
reporting closed head injuries and pursuing compensatory litigation.  The MFIT 
performance of this group (N=7) was compared to that of seven inpatients with TBI in 
the acute phase of recovery (mean time post-injury of 1.1 months).  It was found that 
the malingering group recalled significantly fewer total items (M=8.0) than the TBI 
group (M=12.1).  Millis and Kler further reported a sensitivity of 57% and specificity 
of 100% when using the 7-item cutoff recommended by Lee et al. (1992).  They 
advised against using the 9-item cutoff, as specificity dropped to 71%. 
 A re-examination of the data supplied by Millis and Kler (1995) reveals these 
estimates of sensitivity and specificity to be in error.  Apparently, they considered the 
9-item cutoff to mean nine or fewer items recalled, when in fact it was intended to 
mean less than nine items.  As such, use of the 9-item cutoff continued to yield a 
specificity of 100%, as all TBI patients recalled nine or more items.  This is an 
encouraging finding, as this group was reported to have sustained moderate to severe 
injuries (i.e., Glasgow Coma Scales at time of injury between 13 and 3).  Even more 
encouraging is the fact that only two of the clinical malingerers recalled nine or more 
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items, which places sensitivity at 71%.  However, the fact that all of the clinical 
malingerers were selected on the basis of below chance performance on another 
measure makes it highly probable they were rather blatant in their deception strategies.  
Also, the restricted size of the sample makes it difficult to generalize these findings. 
 In a follow up to their 1994 study, Greiffenstein, Baker, and Gola (1996) 
examined alternative scoring methods for the MFIT using an expanded sample of TBI 
patients (N=60) and probable malingerers (N=90).  Using a more conservative 10-item 
cutoff (fewer than 10 items recalled) derived through discriminant function analysis, 
sensitivity for the possible malingering group was found to be 64%, comparable to the 
rate of 62% found using the 9-item cutoff in the 1994 study.  Unfortunately, 
specificity dropped from 88% to 72% for the TBI group when using the raised cutoff.  
The authors surmised that inclusion of TBI patients with dense amnesia (N=5) was 
inappropriate, as there was no practical clinical basis for giving this measure to 
individuals with objective severe neurological disease, and that malingering is not 
typically an issue with these patients.  Removing these cases from the analyses, 
specificity with the 10-item cutoff increased to 78%.  Given that sensitivity did not 
change between these studies whereas specificity was adversely affected, it stands to 
be argued that the 9-item cutoff be maintained, with malingering suspected whenever 
8 or fewer items are recalled. 
 In summary, the known-groups investigations of the MFIT offer more 
promising results regarding the instrument’s discriminatory power than both 
simulation and differential prevalence studies.  This is relevant, given the limitations 
and questionable validity of the latter designs mentioned by Rogers et al. (1993). 
While the results from these investigations are believed to be more generalizable to 
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real-world samples, a limitation remains the lack of reliable and uncontaminated 
criteria for identifying malingerers, although the Greiffenstein et al. studies were 
designed to address this issue.  Another problem concerns the fact that the findings 
reported here are primarily applicable to individuals seeking civil litigation (i.e., 
disability and/or compensation claims secondary to mild head injury).  Only two 
studies have investigated the MFIT among pretrial criminal defendants (Hayes et al., 
1997; Simon, 1994), and three of these studies (Hayes et al., 1997; Millis & Kler, 
1995; Simon, 1994) were restricted in their sample sizes.  The latter two studies also 
had an increased likelihood the diagnosed malingerers were rather blatant in their 
deception strategies.  As a consequence, generalizations based upon these findings are 
necessarily limited.  There remains a need for replication with larger samples, in 
particular criminal defendants, and including those who are less blatant in their efforts 
to feign mental disorders or cognitive impairment. 
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Summary of Findings 
 This review provides evidence the MFIT has adequate specificity among a 
variety of populations.  Five studies provided data from which estimates of specificity 
could be established for psychiatric patients, from which the following can be 
concluded.  Specificity tends to be high for non-retarded acutely ill psychiatric 
inpatients (e.g., Goldberg & Miller, 1986, 100%; Guilmette et al., 1994, 90%) and 
non-retarded individuals with chronic forms of psychosis (combined data from Back et 
al., 1996, and Simon, 1994, 87%).  Combining these data with the data from Hays et 
al. (1993), the overall specificity for non-retarded psychiatric patients is 83.8% (268 of 
320 patients correctly identified).  Although Back et al. found MFIT performance to 
be unaffected by symptom severity and mental status, Schretlen et al. (1991) reported 
very poor performance for their “severe psychiatric” group.  It should be noted that 
“severe” was never defined in the later study, although scores on the Mini-Mental 
State Examination were highly correlated (r=.81) with MFIT items recalled for the 
combined groups of neurological and psychiatric patients. 
A much lower specificity of 62.5% was found for individuals with a diagnosis 
of mild to moderate mental retardation (Goldberg & Miller, 1986), and even lower 
rates (32.4%) among psychiatric inpatients with intellectual functioning in the 
moderate to mild mental retardation range (Hays et al., 1993).  While the majority of 
patients studied suffered from some form of psychosis or depression, a setback in 
these studies was failure to adequately specify the diagnostic makeup of the sample 
and provide symptom severity ratings (e.g., Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Hays et al., 
1993; Schretlen et al., 1991).  This limits the conclusions that can be reached 
regarding particular diagnostic groups, although the evidence suggests that individuals 
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with a psychiatric diagnosis other than mental retardation can perform adequately on 
the MFIT. 
 For neurological conditions, individuals having suffered intracerebral 
hemorrhage or injuries resulting in severe global cognitive impairment or severe 
organic amnesia had the poorest recall on the MFIT (Greiffenstein et al., 1996; 
Guilmette et al., 1994; Morgan, 1991; Schretlen et al., 1991).  Otherwise, specificity 
was adequate independent of whether the nature of the insult was diffuse or specific 
(Bernard & Fowler, 1988; Lee et al., 1992), or whether the individual was in the acute 
or late phase of recovery (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995).  Specificity 
estimates for these populations ranged from 74 to 100%, and of the studies reviewed, 
six provided data from which an overall specificity could be computed (Arnett et al., 
1995; Bernard & Fowler, 1988; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1992; Millis & 
Kler, 1995; Morgan, 1991).  From these studies, a cutoff of nine items correctly 
recalled resulted in a specificity of 85.8% (266 of 310 patients) for individuals with 
neurological conditions, most of whom were experiencing significant problems with 
memory.  
 Less encouraging are the findings of sensitivity for the MFIT.  When 
examining data from simulation studies, the MFIT was found to have inadequate 
sensitivity.  Three studies provided sufficient information from which an overall 
estimate of sensitivity could be calculated (Arnett et al., 1995; Guilmette et al., 1994; 
Schretlen et al., 1991).  From these studies, 53 out of 141 total simulators failed to 
recall nine or more items, which yields an overall sensitivity of 37.5%.  Even lower 
figures were obtained when the results of the two differential prevalence designs were 
combined (Griffin et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1992).  Of the 107 individuals suspected of 
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malingering in these two studies, 24 failed using the 9-item cutoff, resulting in a 
dismal sensitivity of 22.4%.  As noted, the validity of these designs and the 
generalization of the findings is questionable.  This is evident in the much higher rates 
of sensitivity found in the studies using diagnosed malingerers.  Examining the 
combined data from these studies (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995; 
Simon, 1994), 44 out of 64 individuals diagnosed as malingering through independent 
means were correctly identified through their performance on the MFIT, producing a 
more encouraging sensitivity of 68.8%.  For civil litigants seeking disability and/or 
financial compensation for their injuries, the overall sensitivity was 64%; for forensic 
evaluatees, 85.7%. 
 Using data from the known-groups studies, the 9-item cutoff for the MFIT 
appears to be a valid indicator of malingering among civil litigants/disability claimants 
(.64/.36  > .14/.86).  It is also an effective indicator, whether one uses more liberal 
(i.e., 60 to 66%) or conservative (15 to 33%) estimates of malingering base rates (e.g., 
1 - .66 > .122 + .05; .33 > .122 + .05).  The small combined error rate (17.2%) results 
in a rather broad base rate effectiveness range (i.e., effective when the base rate falls 
between 18 to 82%).  Based on this data, the MFIT is both valid and effective over a 
broad range in distinguishing between individuals malingering memory problems from 
those with memory problems due to neurological causes. 
 Only one study has provided information from which validity and 
effectiveness can be determined for criminal defendants (Simon, 1994).  Using the 
data from this study and the findings from both non-retarded and retarded psychiatric 
patients (as these are the groups criminal defendants are most likely to attempt 
simulating; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986), the MFIT appears to be a valid indicator for 
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malingering memory problems secondary to psychiatric illness (.857/.143 > .162/.838) 
and psychiatric illness plus mental retardation  (.857/.143 > .676/.324).  Given an 
estimated 16 to 20% malingering base rate among criminal defendants, the MFIT 
appears to be effective at identifying malingerers among non-retarded psychiatric 
inpatients (combined error rate of 16.2%), but not among psychiatric patients with 
mental retardation (combined error rate of 59%).  However, definite conclusions 
cannot be made in this regard, as false negative estimates were derived from a single 
study with only 14 malingerers, all of which were noted to be extreme in their 
presentations.  Further research with this population is clearly indicated to determine 
the effectiveness of the MFIT. 
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Qualitative Scoring 
 Using the recommended quantitative scoring system, a minimum 10% of both 
neurological and psychiatric patients would be incorrectly suspected of malingering 
memory complaints.  In cases involving a dual diagnosis of psychosis and mental 
retardation, the rates may be greater than 64%.  Although it would be inappropriate to 
establish a diagnosis of malingering on the basis of a single screening measure and in 
the absence of other objective data, important ramifications can still result.  For 
example, one may be subjected to more extensive testing, stigmatized with a label and 
suffer loss of reputation, lose deserved financial compensation, or even face an 
undeserved prison sentence.  Thus, modifications that can increase specificity and 
improve effectiveness warrant investigation. 
 One method has been lowering the cutoff for the MFIT.  On the basis of their 
respective findings, several investigations (e.g., Guilmette et al., 1994; Lee et al., 
1992) have recommended using lower cutoffs either for the total number of items or 
the total number of rows recalled. However, it was noted these alternate cutoffs were 
found to either result in minimal changes in specificity, or were erroneously based 
upon miscalculations of the data.  More importantly, they resulted in decreasing the 
sensitivity of the MFIT (i.e., Greiffenstein et al., 1996).  Thus, what is needed is a 
method that increases specificity while either maintaining or even improving 
sensitivity.  One potential method advocated by Rogers et al. (1993) is the “magnitude 
of errors” strategy.   This method simply involves examining the differences in 
patterns of incorrect responses between either simulators or known malingerers and 
relevant clinical comparison groups.  This can be accomplished through examining the 
qualitative rather than quantitative errors on the MFIT. 
 33
 The examination of qualitative errors is not new to neuropsychology.  In 1961, 
Benton and Spreen examined the differences in qualitative errors between normals 
simulating brain damage and actual head injured patients on the Benton Visual 
Retention Test.  It was found that simulators made more errors of distortion of recalled 
designs (i.e., bizarre figures) while making fewer perseverative and omission errors 
than actual brain damaged subjects.  Interestingly, it was observed in the first 
normative study of the MFIT (Goldberg & Miller, 1986) that mentally retarded 
patients were more prone to making errors involving perseveration and reversal, 
whereas psychiatric patients typically omitted a single row.  Although the authors 
failed to provide scoring criteria for qualitative errors, they suggested these error types 
be scrutinized to avoid false positives. 
 Several of the studies mentioned have examined qualitative errors in some 
fashion.  Only one type of qualitative error (i.e., repeated items) was examined by 
Schretlen et al. (1991).  While no significant differences were found between any 
groups on this type of error, it was significantly correlated with IQ (r=-.29), a finding 
consistent with that of Goldberg and Miller (1986).  Morgan (1991) found the majority 
(40%) of his neurological sample made the error of misordering geometric shapes 
(actually, 65% of those able to recall the shapes).  Errors of perseveration (repetition) 
were also common, while less common errors involved repeating rows or continuing 
rows (e.g., extending letters from A to E).  It was further noted that 93% of the sample 
recalled all of the capital letters and 83% recalled all Arabic numerals, thus providing 
evidence for a primacy effect in recall.  Morgan therefore suggested that failure to 
recall these two rows should raise the suspicion of malingering, as these were cases of 
true memory impairment and 75% of those who failed the MFIT still recalled the 
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capital letters.  Interestingly, one would expect better recall of items from the last two 
rows, given the findings of a recency effect in the short-term recall of amnesiacs 
(Wiggins & Brandt, 1988).  This unexpected pattern of performance may be 
attributable to a combination of short exposure time (10 seconds) and impaired 
processing speed. 
In the simulation study of Guilmette et al. (1994) it was briefly mentioned that 
some of the simulators added additional items in their recall, which led the authors to 
suggest that a qualitative analysis may improve sensitivity for the MFIT.  Conversely, 
no differences were found between simulators and neurological patients on any of the 
14 qualitative indices examined in the two simulation studies of Arnett et al. (1995).  
Hypothesizing that qualitative errors would be less related to those factors shown to 
affect specificity (i.e., age and intelligence), Griffin et al. (1996) administered the 
MFIT to 90 undergraduate simulators to develop a new qualitative scoring system.  
They identified 10 qualitative “malingering” errors, which were examined with their 
groups of analog malingerers, psychiatrically disabled non-malingerers, and “normal” 
(less severely ill) controls.  The disabled group made significantly more “wrong item” 
errors (i.e., production of recognizable figure not on stimulus card) than the control 
group, and the control group made significantly more “Roman numeral” errors (i.e., 
tally marks drawn as Roman numerals) than the disabled group, which the authors 
judged to be artifacts of illness.  The analog malingerers were found to make more 
dyslexic (i.e., character reversal), embellishment (i.e., elaboration or adornment of 
recognizable character), gestalt (i.e., failure to make a 3 x5 arrangement when 
recalling 15 items), and row sequence errors than the combined groups of disabled and 
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controls.  Moreover, it was found that analog malingerers produced significantly more 
total qualitative errors than the non-malingering groups. 
 The hypothesis of Griffin et al. (1996) regarding the influence of age and 
education was weakly supported, as age accounted for 4.1% of the variance in total 
qualitative error scores for possible malingerers and IQ accounted for 4.1% of the 
variance in qualitative errors for the non-malingering sample.  However, there are 
major limitations to these findings.  The authors varied the MFIT instructions (i.e., 
added instructions to write down items “just as they appeared on the card”) in order to 
produce more scorable errors.  This goes against standard administration procedures, 
and implies that under standard conditions few qualitative errors will be produced.  
This is especially bothersome, given that Griffin et al. noted a low base rate for 
qualitative errors (i.e., average analog malingerer made only one type of qualitative 
error). 
 Finally, only one study using a known-groups design has investigated a 
qualitative scoring method for the MFIT.  In the Greiffenstein et al. (1996) study, 
alternative scoring strategies were examined for the MFIT.  While these were not 
reported as qualitative methods per se, an inspection of their scoring criteria reveals 
that one particular method (i.e., “spatial” scoring) would constitute a qualitative 
method.  Specifically, this score reflects a correct ordering of elements within rows, 
similar to the “misordering” error of Morgan (1991).  Interestingly, the use of spatial 
scoring was found to result in improved rates of sensitivity (69%) and specificity 
(82%).  While this study did not investigate other types of qualitative errors, it does 
provide preliminary evidence that qualitative methods may produce better results 
when using a valid research design. 
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 In summary, there are indications that individuals with known organic 
dysfunction and/or impaired cognitive functioning make specific types of qualitative 
errors.  These mainly include errors of perseveration and misordering of elements, 
which is not unexpected given the nature of the underlying pathology (e.g., Malloy & 
Richardson, 1994).  Furthermore, one study (Morgan, 1991) found that individuals 
with organically based memory problems exhibited a primacy effect in their MFIT 
recall.  Qualitative scoring may therefore prove useful in improving the detection 
ability of the MFIT.  However, several limitations preclude definite conclusions in this 
matter.  This includes a lack of uniformity in the types of errors examined across 
studies, and the fact that no studies using a known-groups design have systematically 
investigated the many identified types of qualitative errors.  Thus, there remains a 
need for more research in this area. 
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The Present Study 
 There is evidence the MFIT has adequate sensitivity and specificity with a 
variety of populations.  However, a number of shortcomings have been identified, 
including inadequate sample sizes, inappropriate inclusion of severely brain injured 
patients, failure to make statistical corrections for multiple comparisons, failure to 
include diagnostic information and symptom ratings for psychiatric patients, failure to 
consider alternative incentives for and assessment of feigning/exaggerating complaints 
among “non-malingering” subjects, miscalculations of data, and reliance upon study 
designs of questionable ecological validity.  Despite these shortcomings, the MFIT 
appears to be a valid and effective screening measure for malingered memory 
complaints within neuropsychological/civil forensic settings.  There are also 
indications that a qualitative scoring method may enhance the MFIT’s efficacy in this 
regard, although no systematic investigation of this method using a sound research 
design has been conducted. 
 One group for whom the MFIT may prove useful is pretrial criminal 
defendants.  These individuals often present with memory deficits relating either to the 
crime itself or as part of a clinical picture in which cognitive deficits are an associated 
feature (e.g., psychosis) to procure an insanity verdict or be seen as incompetent to 
stand trial (Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Schacter, 1986a; 1986b).  However, there has 
only been one investigation to date examining the performance of this group with the 
MFIT (Simon, 1994).  While this study possessed ecological validity, conclusions 
were limited due to the small sample size and use of subjects who were extreme in 
their presentations.  Interestingly, Rogers and Cruise (1998) have contended that 
criminal defendants would be more likely to give extreme presentations, considering 
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the negative consequences of a conviction and that extreme symptoms may be thought 
to be necessary for acquiring an insanity verdict.  While this has intuitive appeal and 
offers encouragement that such individuals would be easily identified through their 
performance on malingering measures, it does pose one major confound.  The clinical 
populations that criminal defendants may be attempting to mimic (individuals found 
not guilty by reason of insanity) are often characterized by severe and chronic 
psychosis and significant intellectual/cognitive deficits.  The observation that these 
populations have been noted to perform quite poorly on the MFIT (e.g., Hays et al., 
1993) poses a serious threat to the ability of the quantitative scoring system in 
differentiating these groups.  Thus, there remains a need for a known-groups 
investigation of the MFIT using both a larger sample of criminal defendants and 
relevant comparison group, and investigating alternative scoring strategies. 
 The present study extended upon previous investigations of the MFIT through 
the following methods.  First, this study examined both quantitative and qualitative 
scoring methods for the MFIT using a known-groups design.  The experimental group 
consisted of an archival group of pretrial criminal defendants (forensic inpatients 
judicially ruled as incompetent to stand trial) who were independently diagnosed as 
malingering and given the MFIT under natural clinical conditions (i.e., as part of a 
comprehensive psychological evaluation for malingering).  In keeping with the 
recommendations of Rogers and Cruise (1998), the performance of this group was 
compared with that of two relevant clinical comparison groups (e.g., individuals with 
similar criminal backgrounds and individuals with similar psychiatric symptoms).  
These consisted of a second archival sample of pretrial (PT) forensic inpatients who 
had not been suspected of malingering and also given the MFIT under normal 
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conditions, and a current control sample of forensic inpatients found NGBRI by the 
local state courts. 
Second, this study extended upon previous research by verifying the presumed 
“non-malingering” status of the NGBRI comparison group.  This was done through 
the administration of additional malingering screening measures (e.g., M-Test, Dot 
Counting Test).  Last, information pertaining to the MFIT’s sensitivity, specificity, 
validity, and effectiveness was computed for both the quantitative and qualitative 
scoring methods, both separately and combined. 
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Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses were offered: 1)  Patients diagnosed as malingering 
would recall fewer total items on the MFIT than non-malingering patients (PT and 
NGBRI); 2) Since psychiatric patients often exhibit varying degrees of intellectual and 
cognitive impairment, it was hypothesized the non-malingering patients would make 
more qualitative errors involving perseveration, misordering of elements, and 
character reversals and rotations than diagnosed malingerers; 3) Diagnosed 
malingerers, in an attempt to portray themselves as insane, would make more 
qualitative errors involving bizarre and unusual reproductions and addition of 
extraneous elements than non-malingering patients;  4) Diagnosed malingerers were 
expected to recall fewer items from the beginning of the MFIT (i.e., failure to show a 
primacy effect) than the non-malingering patients (i.e., Morgan, 1991); and 5)  Linear 
discriminant analysis incorporating both quantitative and qualitative variables would 
yield substantially better discriminating power than the total number of items recalled 
alone. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Three groups of patients were examined in the present study.  The first group, 
diagnosed malingerers (DM), consisted of an archival sample of 44 adult male 
inpatients (pretrial criminal defendants) evaluated at a state forensic hospital between 
the years 1991 and 2000.  Individuals in this group had been judicially declared 
incompetent to stand trial by the local courts and remanded for further evaluation and 
treatment.  These patients were identified by the interdisciplinary treatment team (i.e., 
psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, nurse, and security staff) as either feigning or 
exaggerating problems with psychosis, cognitive dysfunction, or both.  This was 
accomplished on the basis of behavioral observations of inconsistent and/or atypical 
symptom presentations (e.g., unable to do the simplest arithmetic yet observed playing 
spades on the unit) and/or improbably poor performance on the initial mental status 
and competency examinations.  Patients in this group were subsequently referred for a 
psychological evaluation and given the MFIT, along with other measures of 
malingering, as part of a comprehensive battery.  Based upon behavioral observations 
and the combined results of assessment, these individuals were diagnosed as 
malingering using the indices outlined in either the DSM-III-R or DSM-IV (APA, 
1987; 1994).  Although the results of psychological assessment were utilized in 
reaching a final diagnostic decision in most cases, in none of these cases did the MFIT 
contribute to the determination of the diagnosis of malingering. 
For comparison, data was collected on a second archival patient group 
consisting of 32 adult male pretrial criminal defendants (PT) also found incompetent 
to stand trial and remanded for further evaluation and treatment during the same time 
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period.  Patients in this group were selected on the basis they had not been suspected 
of or diagnosed as malingering and had also been administered the MFIT, although as 
part of a more comprehensive psychological (i.e., diagnostic) or neuropsychological 
assessment to check for level of effort.  As with the DM group, the MFIT did not 
contribute to the determination of PT patients’ non-malingering status. 
According to Rogers and Cruise (1998), comparison groups in malingering 
research should be relevant to forensic evaluations in terms of having a representative 
range of mental disorders and criminal backgrounds.  Although the PT group would 
appear to meet this criteria, that they were not suspected of or diagnosed as 
malingering does not rule out the possibility that some patients in this group were in 
fact malingering.  Data was therefore collected on a third and current group of 30 adult 
male forensic inpatients who had been judicially declared NGBRI by the courts and 
remanded to the same state forensic hospital for continued care and treatment.  This 
group was selected for purposes of comparison because:  1) They have a 
representative range of mental disorders and criminal backgrounds; 2) They have a 
higher incentive for “faking good” for purpose of release, and thus are considered less 
likely to be “faking bad;” 3) They are a highly relevant comparison group in that the 
NGBRI status is the typical goal of pretrial malingerers. 
Materials 
 Rey 15-Item Visual Memory Test.  The Rey 15-Item Visual Memory Test 
(MFIT; Lezak, 1976; Rey, 1964) was developed as a screening measure for 
malingered memory impairment.  It consists of 15 items, arranged in three rows and 
five columns, which are printed on an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper.  The respondent is 
told they will be shown a card that has 15 different (emphasized) symbols on it.  They 
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are further informed they will have 10 seconds to view the card, after which time the 
card will be taken away and they will be asked to draw everything they can remember.  
The traditional quantitative scoring method involves simply counting the total number 
of items correctly recalled, with scores of less than nine items recalled used in raising 
the suspicion of malingering. 
For the present study, MFIT protocols for all participants were scored in terms 
of the number of correct items recalled and along the various qualitative dimensions 
identified through previous investigations.  These qualitative errors were defined to 
the fullest extent possible based upon the descriptions provided in the respective 
studies. 
 Negative Impression Management Scale.  The Negative Impression 
Management (NIM) scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (Morey, 1991) was 
used to screen for the exaggeration of psychopathology among the NGBRI 
participants (Appendix B).  It consists of nine items, selected on the basis of very low 
endorsement rates, which represent an exaggerated unfavorable self-impression or 
extremely bizarre and unlikely symptoms (e.g., “I have visions in which I see myself 
forced to commit crimes”) (Morey, 1996).  Items are rated by the respondent on a 4-
point scale, ranging from 0 ‘false, not at all true’ to 3 ‘very true’ which are then 
summed to obtain a total raw score (possible range of 0 to 27).  The PAI was 
standardized with large clinical, normal census-matched, and college student samples 
(N>1,000 each).  Overall, good psychometric properties were reported by Morey 
(1991).  The median Cronbach’s alpha across the 22 full scales was above .80 for the 
entire normative sample, with an average 3-week test-retest reliability of .78 for a 
combined sample of college students and community volunteers. 
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For the NIM scale, an alpha of .74 was reported for the normative clinical 
sample and a 3-week test-retest reliability of .75 for the combined normal sample.  
Morey (1991) suggested that a raw score of 13 or more be used as a cutoff, as scores 
in this range were more than 2 standard deviations above the mean for the clinical 
sample.  He reported on a simulation study which revealed that use of this cutoff 
resulted in correct classification of 86.5% of college student simulators, while only 
5.9% of a clinical sample and 1.5% of a normal sample were misclassified.   Also, a 
known-groups study by Rogers, Sewell, Cruise, Wang, and Ustad (1998) revealed that 
NIM scores above 13 were a useful screen for identifying criminal forensic 
malingerers.  Morey (1996) provides further clinical interpretations for T-score ranges, 
as well as a summary of additional simulation design investigations of the scale.  In 
the present study, a raw score of 13 or more was used as the cutoff for possible 
malingering.  
 M-Test.  The M-Test (Beaber et al., 1985) was also used to assess the 
possibility of feigning or exaggeration of psychiatric symptoms among the NGBRI 
participants.  The M-Test was developed as a screening measure to specifically detect 
the malingering of schizophrenic symptoms.  It consists of 33 true-false items, divided 
into three scales.  The C (Confusion) scale contains eight “attitude-belief” items, none 
of which involve symptom endorsement, and which subjects are expected to endorse 
in a fixed direction (e.g., “I believe that cancer is a horrible disease” should be 
answered true).  These items are used to assess comprehension, and are placed at the 
beginning of the test.  The body of the test contains randomly ordered items from the 
M (Malingering) and S (Schizophrenia) scales.  The M scale items reflect atypical and 
extremely severe symptoms not characteristic of mental illness (e.g., “I believe that 
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God has appointed me to teach the Zolan beliefs to all people that I meet”), whereas S 
scale items are genuine symptoms associated with schizophrenia (e.g., “Periodically I 
am bothered by hearing voices that no one else hears”).  Using a sample of 
schizophrenia patients and undergraduate simulators, a score of 4 or more positively 
endorsed M scale items was identified as the cutoff for suspected malingering in the 
pilot study of Beaber et al. (1985). 
 In a review of studies using the M-Test, Smith (1997) noted that simulation 
studies provided encouraging estimates of sensitivity and specificity, whereas studies 
with suspected malingerers yielded more variable results.  In an effort to improve the 
utility of this instrument, Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis (1992) developed “Rule-Out” and 
“Rule-In” criteria for the M-Test using those items with the highest positive and 
negative predictive power as determined through a known-groups investigation.  Two 
options were provided, one that was more conservative and maximized specificity 
(Option A) and one which maximized sensitivity (Option B).  Both the original and 
revised scoring criteria were applied to the M-Test data for the NGBRI group, as well 
as those archival patients who received the measure. 
 Dot Counting Test.  The Dot Counting Test (DCT) is another screening 
measure for malingering developed by Andre Rey (Lezak, 1995; Rey, 1941).  It 
consists of 12 cards on which are printed a series of dots.  The first 6 cards contain sets 
of ungrouped dots, whereas the last 6 cards contain sets of grouped dots.  Respondents 
are presented with the cards in a fixed non-sequential order, and instructed to count the 
number of dots as quickly as possible.  It is expected the non-malingering patient will 
take longer to count the ungrouped dots than the grouped dots, with increases in 
counting time proportional to increases in the number of dots.  Binks, Gouvier, and 
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Waters (1997) found the total number of incorrect responses for both grouped and 
ungrouped dots provided better discrimination than five other indices derived from 
DCT protocols between college student simulators and a heterogeneous sample of 
patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation.  For the present study, the cutoff 
for suspected malingering was established as either the total grouped counting time 
exceeding the total ungrouped counting time, or the total number of errors (grouped 
plus ungrouped) greater than one standard deviation above the mean of the patient 
sample of Binks et al. (1997) (i.e., more than 4 errors). 
 Expanded Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale.  The Expanded Brief Psychiatric 
Rating Scale, Version 4.0 (BPRS-E; Ventura et al., 1993) was used to obtain current 
(2-week) ratings of psychiatric symptoms for the NGBRI participants (see Appendix 
C).  The BPRS-E is used to assess 24 separate dimensions of psychiatric symptoms 
(e.g., hallucinatory behavior, flat affect).  Each dimension is rated on a behaviorally 
anchored 7-point Likert scale, with ratings ranging from 1 ‘not present’ to 7 
‘extremely severe.’  NGBRI participants were assessed by doctoral students trained to 
a minimum intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of .80 according to University of 
Chicago Center for Psychiatric Rehabilitation criterion ratings.  Ratings were based 
upon a combination of behavioral observations and participants’ answers to standard 
questions posed in an interview format. 
 Shipley Institute of Living Scale.  The Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS; 
Zachary, 1991) was used to provide an estimate of the general intellectual functioning 
of NGBRI participants.  The SILS has been widely used in a variety of settings with 
both adolescents and adults to provide a brief measure of verbal intellectual ability.  It 
consists of a Vocabulary subtest containing 40 items assessing verbal skills, and an 
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Abstraction subtest containing 20 items which assess abstract thinking skills.  Age-
based norms are provided from which the estimated WAIS-R Full Scale IQ can be 
computed from the total score.  Since the SILS’ inception in the 1930’s, additional 
norms have been collected for a large (N=290) sample of mixed psychiatric patients.  
Furthermore, Zachary reported on two studies which found a correlation of .85 
between SILS estimated IQ and actual WAIS-R IQ’s for adult psychiatric patients.   
Procedures 
 The present study was reviewed and approval granted by the Institutional 
Review Boards of Louisiana State University, the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals, and the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic Division.  The 
hospital charts of all patients (both archival and current) were then thoroughly 
reviewed for the following sources of information and entered onto a demographics 
form (Appendix D).  First, demographic information of theoretical relevance to MFIT 
performance (age at the time of testing, years of education, and any available IQ 
scores) were collected.  Second, information for determining the groups was collected.  
This included the number of prior arrests, commitment charge(s), and maximum 
possible prison sentence as outlined in West’s (1998) Louisiana State statutes.  Last, 
information useful for verifying patients’ malingering status was gathered (i.e., 
psychiatric diagnoses, prior suspicion or diagnosis of malingering, documented 
behavioral observations of staff, reasons for testing referral, results of any competency 
and malingering assessments), as was other potentially relevant data (i.e., medication 
status, documented history of neurological injury, number of previous hospitalizations 
for psychosis, documented history of mental retardation). 
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 Selection Procedures for the DM and PT Groups.  The selection criteria for 
inclusion in the archival DM group included 1) pretrial legal status at the time of 
evaluation 2) a diagnosis of malingering by the interdisciplinary treatment team, and 
3) having been administered the MFIT, with a copy of the patient’s reproduction 
available for re-scoring.  The same criteria were used in selecting archival PT subjects, 
with the noted exception that malingering had been definitely ruled out by the 
treatment team. 
 Selection Procedures for NGBRI Participants.  Potential participants in the 
NGBRI group were screened by a clinician independent of the study for the presence 
of factors that could impair ability to provide informed consent (e.g., severe 
disorganization or intellectual impairment).  Patients who were determined to be 
suitable for the study and capable of giving consent, and for whom there were no 
current or past indicators or diagnoses of malingering (as determined through chart 
review) were approached for participation and had read to them the study consent 
form (Appendix E).  Participants’ level of understanding was then assessed through 
having them paraphrase major points and answering questions quizzing their 
understanding of the consent form.  As outlined by Simon (1994), to reduce the 
likelihood of confusion and possible malingering among NGBRI participants they 
were further informed that they were no longer facing legal charges and their results 
would not be shared with the courts or hospital staff. 
 NGBRI participants were subsequently administered the MFIT and SILS and 
were rated on the BPRS-E.  As previously mentioned, patients of NGBRI status are 
considered to have less incentive to malinger impairment and more incentive to look 
good for purposes of less restrictive placement (Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1998).  
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While this is a reasonable assumption, it fails to take into account other incentives for 
malingering (e.g., acquiring a single room, gaining staff attention).  Moreover, a 
shortcoming in previous studies has been a failure to verify (through standardized 
assessment) the malingering status of those patients assumed to be non-malingering.  
Thus, NGBRI patients were given additional malingering screening measures (NIM 
scale, M-Test, and DCT) to rule out the possibility of malingering.  All NGBRI 
subjects were paid two dollars for their participation. 
  Scoring Procedures. Following the collection of data, the MFIT protocols for 
all subjects (excluding identifying information other than the study number) were 
scored along the specified quantitative and qualitative dimensions (see Table 2) by 
two independent raters (doctoral candidates in clinical psychology with experience in 
using the MFIT) blind to subjects’ diagnoses and group membership.  Raters were 
given the opportunity to become familiarized with the scoring criteria and have 
questions regarding these criteria clarified prior to rating the protocols.  It was noted 
there were some areas of confusion regarding the scoring criteria for Primacy Effect, 
Capitalization, Row Perseveration, and Wrong Item errors.  This was clarified through 
joint discussion and the scoring criteria were revised (see italicized print in Table 2).  
After the ratings were completed, the agreement between raters was assessed through 
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC’s) and kappa agreement, where appropriate.  
As a check for accuracy, interrater reliability (ICC and kappa) was also 
calculated for the data derived from hospital records.  This was accomplished through 
selecting 20 subjects at random and having an independent rater (clinical psychology 
graduate student not affiliated with the study) review the subjects’ hospital records and 
complete the demographics form. 
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Table 2 
 
Scoring Procedures for the MFIT 
            
Quantitative: Total number of items correctly recalled (regardless of location). 
 
Qualitative: (scored for the total number of occurrences for each of these types, with  
the exception of Primacy Effect, Capitalization, Roman Numeral, and Gestalt). 
 
Primacy Effect - the total number of items recalled from the first two rows of the 
   stimulus card, regardless of location. 
 
Item Perseveration  - repetition of an individual item (e.g., A A). 
 
Row Perseveration - repetition of an entire row (differentiate from Capitalization 
error). 
 
Row Extension - continuing the elements of a row (e.g., A B C D E). 
 
Reversal -  reversing a symbol (e.g., “b” drawn as “d”). 
 
Rotation - rotating a correctly drawn figure by more than 30 degrees. 
 
Capitalization - drawing the row of small cap letters in large caps (must be in 
the correct location, i.e. third row).  Not counted in total score. 
 
Roman Numeral - drawing the tally marks as Roman numerals.  Counted in total 
score. 
 
Within Row Error - misordering the elements within a row (e.g., B A C). 
 
Row Sequence Error- misordering of the rows (e.g., 1 2 3 before A B C). 
 
Between Row Error - rearranging the items from two or more rows (e.g., A 2 B). 
 
Wrong Item Error - number of produced recognizable figures not on stimulus card 
   (differentiate from row extension). 
 
Extraneous Element - number of indistinguishable or bizarre figures not on the 
stimulus card (differentiate from row extension and wrong item 
error). 
 
Gestalt Error - failure to reproduce a 3 x 5 configuration when 15 items are 
present 
 
Embellishment - adornment or elaboration of recognizable characters (e.g., 
smiley face drawn in the circle); also include elaborate drawings 
in place of the stimulus material     
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Results 
Interrater Reliability 
 MFIT Scoring Indices.  The reliability between raters’ scoring of all subjects’ 
MFIT protocols was computed using primarily ICC.  Kappa coefficients (percent 
agreement corrected for chance) were used for the three qualitative variables scored 
for their presence or absence (i.e., Capitalization, Roman Numeral, and Gestalt) (Table 
3). 
Table 3 
Interrater Reliabilities for the Quantitative and Qualitative MFIT Scoring Indices 
            
Scoring Index     ICC   Kappa 
            
 
Total Correct (quantitative)   .97   --- 
Primacy     .95   --- 
Item Perseveration    .86   --- 
Row Perseveration    .94   --- 
Row Extension    .90   --- 
Reversal     1.00   --- 
Rotation     1.00   --- 
Within Row Error    .91   --- 
Between Row Error    .84   --- 
Row Sequence Error    .81   --- 
Wrong Item     .85   --- 
Extraneous Element    .98   --- 
Embellishment    .86   --- 
Roman Numeral    ---   1.00 
Capitalization     ---   .95 
Gestalt      ---   * 
            
 
Note.  * Unable to compute kappa coefficient due to the low frequency of occurrence. 
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Overall, the interrater reliability for the quantitative and qualitative scoring 
indices was found to be at an acceptably high level (>.80), with more than half of the 
indices (56%) over .90.  Since such a high level of reliability was obtained, one rater 
was randomly selected and her scores used for statistical analyses.  Further, it was 
noted the “Gestalt” error previously identified by Griffin et al. (1996) was found to 
have occurred only once out of the 106 protocols.  This qualitative score was therefore 
eliminated from further analyses. 
 Hospital Records Review.  To ensure the information from hospital records 
was obtained accurately and reliably, 20 subjects were randomly selected to have their 
records reviewed by an independent rater.  This information was entered onto a 
demographics form and subjected to analysis for interrater reliability through a 
combination of ICC and kappa.  The average reliability for all items was .895 (range 
of .80 to 1.00), which is at an acceptable level of reliability. 
Verification of Group Membership 
 The following is a summary of the information that went into the treatment 
teams’ clinical decisions regarding patients’ malingering status.  This was done to 
better determine the accuracy of diagnostic decisions and estimate the probability of 
malingering among the non-malingering samples. 
Diagnosed Malingerers. Inclusion in the DM group was based upon a 
diagnosis of malingering by the hospital interdisciplinary treatment teams.  Diagnoses 
were established primarily on the basis of behavioral observations by multiple staff 
and in various situations (e.g., during initial psychiatric and psychological mental 
status and competency evaluations, interactions on and off the unit).  The most 
frequently observed behavior was inconsistency in either the patient’s presentation or 
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report of symptoms, as noted in 70.5% of cases.  This was followed by an unusually 
impaired or improbably poor performance on initial examinations (65.9%) and the 
presentation of atypical or rare symptoms (50.0%).  Less common were presentations 
involving unusually or extremely severe symptoms (29.6%), vague descriptions of 
symptoms (22.7%), highly inconsistent demonstration of abilities (18.2%) and 
improbable or absurd symptoms (15.9%).  Furthermore, most diagnosed malingerers 
were observed to engage in a combination of at least three separate behaviors believed 
to be indicative of malingering (Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, & Bagby, 1991).  Based on 
these observations, staff had determined that 6 patients were malingering cognitive 
impairment, 4 were malingering psychosis, and 34 were malingering elements of both. 
 In the majority of cases the results of a formal psychological (malingering) 
evaluation were used to confirm observations.  Of the 44 patients in the DM group, 41 
had been administered at least one malingering measure (primarily the SIRS, M-Test, 
or DCT) in addition to the MFIT.  Among the three patients who did not receive 
additional assessment, one was highly uncooperative with efforts and had been 
diagnosed as malingering on a previous admission.  The other two had been diagnosed 
on the basis of their symptom presentations, which were noted to be of a rather 
extreme nature. 
Of the 41 DM patients formally assessed, 37 (90.2%) met criteria for 
malingering on at least one measure other than the MFIT.  Specifically, 22 of the 30 
patients given the SIRS were determined to be malingering elements of psychosis.  
Among the 8 patients who “passed” the SIRS, 6 scored in the malingering range on 
the M-Test, DCT, or both, as did 9 of the 11 patients who did not receive the SIRS.  
Of interest is the finding that, among the four DM patients who did not score in the 
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malingering range on any additional measure, three obtained extremely low MFIT 
total scores (2, 3, and 4) and one scored at the cutoff.  Looking at historical factors, 
nine patients had a documented preexisting psychiatric condition involving psychosis 
(i.e., through previous hospitalizations, psychiatric diagnosis, and/or past treatment 
with neuroleptics).  Another three patients had a highly probable history of psychosis 
(through independent reports but no available confirming records), and one had a 
documented history of mental retardation.  None of the DM had a documented or 
confirmed neurological condition (e.g., through electroencephalogram or CAT scan) 
and only two had a history of traumatic brain injury (both noted to present with 
impairments inconsistent with either the extent or location of injury).  Thus, a high 
percentage (70.5%) of patients diagnosed as malingering were presenting with 
problems involving psychosis, cognitive impairment, or both but without any prior 
history of these conditions.  However, almost one third of the diagnosed malingerers 
had experience with these conditions and therefore may have been more sophisticated 
(i.e., less blatant) in their presentations. 
 Finally, presence of an antisocial personality disorder (in conjunction with 
other factors) is one of the criteria used for making a diagnosis of malingering (APA, 
1994).  Among the DM group, 14 (31.8%) met diagnostic criteria for antisocial 
personality disorder.  A chi-square analysis revealed this number to be significantly 
different (p=.025) than the number of PT patients diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder (6.3%). 
 Pretrial (non-malingerers). Although patients in this group were selected on the 
basis they had not been suspected of or diagnosed as malingering, this did not rule out 
the possibility that individuals in this group were malingering.  It was therefore 
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decided to look at other available information to better assess this possibility.  In terms 
of diagnoses, the primary Axis I diagnosis for this group was schizophrenia (most in 
conjunction with a substance abuse diagnosis), and the primary Axis II diagnosis was 
mental retardation (see Table 4).  Among the 32 PT patients, only 10 (31.3%) had no 
prior documented history of either psychosis or mental retardation.  A chi-square 
revealed this number to be significantly different from the number of DM patients 
with no prior history, X2  (4, N=76) = 11.092, p=.001. 
Table 4 
Primary Axis I and Axis II Diagnoses for the Two Non-Malingering Groups 
            
 
     PT    NGBRI 
Diagnosis            (N=32)    (N=30) 
            
AXIS I 
    Schizophrenia   14 (43.8%)   21 (70.0%) 
    Substance Abuse   6   (18.8%)   2   (6.7%) 
    Major Depression   5   (15.6%)   3  (10.0%) 
    Substance-Induced Dementia 3   (9.4%)   0   (0.0%) 
    Organic Mental Disorder  2   (6.3%)   1   (3.3%) 
    None    1   (3.1%)   0   (0.0%) 
    Other    1   (3.1%)   3   (10.0%) 
 
AXIS II 
    Mental Retardation (Mild)  15 (46.9%)   3   (10.0%) 
    Borderline Intellect   7   (21.9%)   4   (13.3%) 
            
 
Among the reasons for administration of the MFIT, 12 patients were given the 
MFIT as part of a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation involving potential 
memory problems.  Another 13 were given the MFIT as part of an overall diagnostic 
assessment, one in which the patient was presenting with acute and severe symptoms 
(typically disorganization).  Staff had determined that four of these patients were 
experiencing a first episode of psychosis.  The MFIT was given as a check for level of 
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effort on competency evaluation and personality/intellectual assessment in six cases.  
Only one patient received the MFIT as part of a comprehensive malingering 
evaluation, although he had never been suspected of actual malingering by the hospital 
staff (i.e., one sanity commission member was uncertain and suggested the possibility 
be ruled out through assessment).   
Despite the absence of true suspicion of malingering, 20 PT patients had been 
given the SIRS, M-Test, or DCT, either alone or in combination.  This is common 
practice within forensic settings, given the legal implications and potential serious 
nature of some patients’ charges (e.g., death penalty in First Degree Murder cases).  
None of the 13 patients given the SIRS were found to be malingering on this measure, 
neither were the 5 patients who received only the M-Test or the 2 patients who only 
received the DCT.  Of the PT patients who received the M-Test (N=14), only one 
scored in the malingering range when using the original criteria of Beaber et al. 
(1985), whereas two would have fallen in this range using the revised criteria of 
Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis (1992).  Using Rey’s original scoring criteria (Lezak, 1983), 
three patients scored in the malingering range on the DCT, whereas two would have 
done so using the criteria of Binks et al. (1997).  In none of these cases did an 
individual who scored in the malingering range on one test do so on a second test. 
 Examining hospital staffs’ behavioral observations of PT patients, only three 
behavioral indicators suggestive of malingering (Rogers et al., 1991) were observed 
with any degree of regularity.  The most frequently observed behavior was unusually 
impaired or improbably poor performance on initial examinations by seven patients 
(21.9%).  This was followed by inconsistency in the presentation or report of 
symptoms (12.5%) and unusually severe or extreme symptoms (9.4%).  However, 
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staff indicated these behaviors were most likely due to either acute psychosis or 
impaired intellectual functioning, which combined with the results of standardized 
assessment would indicate the probability of malingering to be rather low in this 
sample. 
NGBRI Controls. To confirm the non-malingering status of the NGBRI group, 
participants were given additional malingering screening measures including the M-
Test, DCT, and Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale of the PAI.  It was 
found that no one scored above the suggested cutoff for malingering on the NIM 
(M=4.43, SD=3.58, range = 0 to12).  Only one NGBRI participant scored in the 
malingering range using the original DCT criteria, whereas two fell in the malingering 
range when using the criteria of Binks et al. (1997).  On the M-Test, six patients 
scored in the malingering range when using the original criteria, a number that 
doubled when using the revised and improved criteria of Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis 
(1992).  The poor performance on this measure was not entirely surprising, given the 
aforementioned problems with variable rates of sensitivity and specificity for this 
measure (Smith, 1997).  Additionally, Hankins, Barnard, and Robbins (1993) noted 
that one problem with the M-Test was that it is essentially a cognitive task, and found 
that the cognitive status (level of cognitive impairment) of the individual could 
significantly impact their ability to engage in the task.  This finding was confirmed in 
the current sample through significant correlations (p<.05) between BPRS-E items 
reflecting cognitive status (i.e., disorientation and conceptual disorganization) and the 
total M (malingering) scale items (r=.315 and .338, respectively). 
 These results appear to verify the non-malingering status of patients in the 
NGBRI group.  Only one NGBRI patient scored in the malingering range on more 
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than one measure (M-Test or DCT).  However, this was the case only when the 
revised M-Test scoring criteria were used, which in turn appear to have less specificity 
than the original scoring criteria, at least for this sample.  Moreover, this patient had a 
longstanding and documented history of mental health problems involving both 
mental retardation and schizophrenia (i.e., five previous hospitalizations), and had 
recently obtained a WAIS-3 IQ of 55.  It was therefore decided his performance was 
most likely attributable to genuine psychiatric problems and low IQ and he was 
retained for the study.  A breakdown of patients’ malingering classification on each of 
the three primary malingering measures is provided in Tables 5 to 7. 
Table 5 
Malingering Classification of DM and PT Patients Using the SIRS 
            
       DM       PT  
Classification    (N=30)   (N=13) 
            
 
Malingering    22 (73.3%)     0 (0%) 
 
Not Malingering     8 (26.7%)   13 (100%) 
            
 
Table 6 
 
Malingering Classification of DM, PT, and NGBRI Patients Using the DCT 
            
 
        DM     PT  NGBRI 
 
Classification    (N=23) (N=12) (N=30) 
            
(Grouped Time > Ungrouped Time) 
 Malingering   13 (56.5%) 3 (25.0%) 1 (3.3%) 
 Not Malingering  10 (43.5%) 9 (75.0%) 29 (96.7%) 
(Total Number of Errors) 
 Malingering   2 (8.7%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (6.7%) 
 Not Malingering  21 (91.3%) 10 (83.3%) 28 (93.3%) 
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Table 7 
Malingering Classification of DM, PT, and NGBRI Patients Using the M-Test 
            
 
        DM     PT  NGBRI 
Classification    (N=36) (N=14) (N=30) 
            
 
(Original Criteria)a 
 
 Malingering   26 (72.2%)   1 (7.1%)   6 (20.0%) 
 
 Not Malingering  10 (27.8%) 13 (92.9%) 24 (80.0%) 
 
(Revised Criteria)b 
 
 Malingering   29 (80.6%) 2 (14.3%) 12 (40.0%) 
 
 Not Malingering    7 (19.4%) 12 (85.7%) 18 (60.0%) 
            
 
Note: a Original criteria of Beaber et al. (1985), with malingering indicated by a score 
of > 4 positively endorsed M-scale items.  b  Revised criteria of Rogers, Bagby, & 
Gillis (1992), with malingering indicated by a score of < 4 on selected Rule Out items 
and > 2 on selected Rule In items. 
Demographic Data Analysis 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine group 
differences on the demographic variables of age and education.  There was a 
significant difference between groups for age (F[2,103] = 4.486, p = .014), and a post 
hoc test for Least Significant Differences (LSD) revealed the NGBRI control group to 
be significantly older than both the PT and DM patients (both p’s <.05).  There was 
also a significant group difference for years of education (p = .021), which a post hoc 
LSD test revealed to be attributable to patients in the DM group having fewer years of 
education than the PT group (p = .007).  A chi-square analysis did not reveal any 
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differences between the three groups in terms of racial composition, X2 (2, N=106) = 
2.795, p = .247 (Table 8). 
Table 8 
Demographic Variables by Group 
            
 
Demographic        DM         PT  NGBRI 
Variable     (N=44)     (N=32)  (N=30) 
            
 
Age   31.55a (10.55)  32.94b (11.02)  38.63a b (8.91) 
 
Education    8.14a (2.61)    9.78a (2.55)    9.20 (2.55) 
 
Ethnicity 
     
    Caucasian         5          8          7 
 
    African-American      39        24        23 
            
 
Note: a b Denotes groups which significantly differed at the .05 level. 
 
 That NGBRI controls were significantly older was not unexpected, as this legal  
status is not typically obtained until after competency restoration efforts have been 
completed and the individual has been through the process of trial.  However, previous 
findings of a significant correlation between age and the total number of MFIT items 
recalled (Griffin et al., 1996; Hays et al., 1993) indicates the need to co-vary for the 
effects of age in subsequent analyses.  With regard to education, of primary 
importance is the relative equivalence of the two non-malingering groups (PT and 
NGBRI) on this variable.  More precisely, it would be difficult to ascertain the true 
effects of educational level on the MFIT performance of the DM group since their 
scores were of dubious validity.  Also, the educational level of this group was of 
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questionable validity as it was often obtained through self-report pursuant to difficulty 
in procuring school records. 
 In examining the relevance of comparison groups (Rogers & Cruise, 1998), 
there were no significant differences between groups on those variables reflecting 
criminal background.  Specifically, one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant 
differences between DM, PT, and NGBRI patients in the total number of arrests prior 
to hospitalization (F[2, 103] = .581, p = .561), total number of felony convictions (F[2, 
103] = .928, p = .399), or total number of misdemeanor convictions (F[2, 103] = 
1.249, p = 2.91) (Table 9).   
Table 9 
Mean Number of Prior Arrests, Felony, and Misdemeanor Convictions by Group 
            
Historical    DM  PT  NGBRI 
Variable    (N=44) (N=32) (N=30) 
            
Total Prior Arrests   9.43 (10.66) 7.56 (9.82) 7.27 (7.16) 
Total Felony Convictions  1.02 (1.37) 0.53 (1.14) 0.93 (2.23) 
Total Misdemeanor Convictions 1.07 (1.77) 1.78 (3.70) 0.83 (1.68) 
            
 
The three comparison groups were found to be relatively homogenous in terms 
of the primary (i.e., more serious) commitment charge, as indicated by a non-
significant chi-square, X2 (12, N=106) = 13.566, p=.329 (Table 10).  Of interest is the 
finding that approximately half of all patients had been involuntarily committed for 
violent offenses against person (e.g., murder, aggravated rape, aggravated assault and 
battery).  These types of charges could potentially result in severe punishment (e.g., 
life imprisonment and death penalty), which presumably would provide stronger 
incentives to malinger (Schacter, 1986a). 
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Table 10 
Percentage of Patients in Each Group by Primary Commitment Charge 
            
               DM            PT        NGBRI 
Charge             (N=44)        (N=32)        (N=30) 
            
Murder             20.5%          21.9%          16.7% 
Attempted Murder            13.6%          18.8%            6.7% 
Other Violent Crimes Against Person         18.2%            6.3%          33.3% 
Non-Violent Crimes Against Person            6.8%            3.1%            6.7% 
Aggravated Theft/Property Crime          20.5%          18.8%          26.7% 
Minor Theft-Related Crimes             9.1%            9.4%            6.7% 
Drug-Related Offenses           11.4%          21.9%            3.3% 
            
 
On the basis of these results, it would appear the three comparison groups met 
the criteria of Rogers and Cruise (1998) for relevance in that they possessed similar 
criminal backgrounds. 
Quantitative Scoring 
 The original (quantitative) scoring method for the MFIT involved totaling the 
number of items correctly recalled, with fewer than nine items recalled being used as 
the cutoff for raising the suspicion of malingering (Lezak, 1976).  Applying this 
criteria to patients’ MFIT protocols, approximately 21 of the 44 DM patients would 
have been correctly suspected of malingering, providing a sensitivity of 47.7% and a 
false negative rate of 52.3%.  For the two non-malingering groups, a high false 
positive rate of 43.8% was obtained for PT patients, although a more encouraging 
false positive rate of 13.3% was found for NGBRI patients.  It was also found that the 
average number of items recalled by DM patients fell below the 9-item cutoff 
(M=8.27, SD=4.05), while that for the non-malingering PT (M=9.78, SD=3.02) and 
NGBRI patients (M=11.90, SD=3.18) fell above the cutoff.  Using a one-way  
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ANOVA, a significant between-groups difference was found in mean total scores 
(p<.001), which a post hoc LSD test revealed to be attributable to NGBRI patients 
scoring higher than both PT patients (p=.020) and DM patients (p<.001).  These 
results were virtually unchanged when using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to 
control for the effects of age (p<.001).  A breakdown of the number of patients in each 
group by quantitative scores is provided in Table 11. 
Table 11 
 
Number of Patients in Each Group by Quantitative MFIT Scores 
            
 
Total Items       DM     PT  NGBRI 
Recalled    (N=44) (N=32) (N=30) 
            
 
2     3 (6.8)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
3     4 (15.9) 0 (0)  0 (0) 
4     2 (20.5) 0 (0)  1 (3.3) 
5     3 (27.3) 1 (3.1)  1 (6.7) 
6     5 (38.6) 3 (12.5) 0 (6.7) 
7     2 (43.2) 6 (31.3) 2 (13.3) 
8     2 (47.7) 4 (43.8) 0 (13.3)  
9     9 (68.2) 2 (50.0) 3 (23.3) 
10     3 (75.0) 2 (56.3) 1 (26.7) 
11     2 (79.6) 4 (68.8) 2 (33.3) 
12     1 (81.8) 5 (84.4) 7 (56.7) 
13     0 (81.8) 0 (84.4) 0 (56.7) 
14     2 (86.4) 1 (87.5) 4 (70.0) 
15     6 (100) 4 (100) 9 (100)  
            
 
Note.  Cumulative percentage in parentheses. 
 
 Hypothesis 1. In the first hypothesis it was predicted that non-malingering 
patients would obtain significantly higher total MFIT scores than malingering patients.  
While the finding of a significant difference in quantitative scores between NGBRI 
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and DM patients lends partial support to this hypothesis, that PT and DM patients did 
not significantly differ was contrary to expectations.  This is of greater concern as the 
PT and DM patients are most likely to receive the MFIT in clinical settings. 
In terms of validity (sensitivity/false negatives > false positives/specificity) 
and effectiveness (base rate > false positives + false negatives or 1- base rate > false 
positives + false negatives), the traditional quantitative scoring method was found to 
be valid for differentiating both PT (.477/.523 > .438/.562) and NGBRI patients 
(.477/.523 > .133/.867) from DM.  However, this method did not appear to be an 
effective indicator for malingering with this sample.  Specifically, the combined error 
rates for PT and DM (.303+.184) and NGBRI and DM (.311+.054) were in excess of 
the estimated malingering base rate among criminal defendants (16%; Rogers et al., 
1998).  These results attest to the need to examine alternative scoring methods that 
might improve the efficacy of the MFIT. 
Qualitative Scoring 
Contrary to the findings of Griffin et al. (1996), a relatively high base rate for 
qualitative errors was found among all three patient groups (Table 12).  Among the 
DM group, only 25% made but one type of qualitative error, and over half (52.3%) 
made two or more distinct types of errors.  Among the non-malingering PT and 
NGBRI groups these rates were 46.9% and 36.7% for one qualitative error type, and 
40.6% and 46.7% for two or more qualitative error types, respectively.  A one-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant differences between these groups in terms of the 
average number of distinct error types (F[2, 103] = .599, p = .551) or the total number 
of all errors made (F[2, 103] = .242, p = .786). 
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Table 12 
Number of Patients in Each Group by the Number of Distinct Qualitative Error Types 
            
       Group 
 
Number of Distinct        DM       PT   NGBRI 
Error Types      (N=44)   (N=32)   (N=30) 
            
 
0     10 (22.7%) 4 (12.5%) 5 (16.7%) 
1     11 (25.0%) 15 (46.9%) 11 (36.7%) 
2     16 (36.4%) 4 (12.5%) 6 (20.0%) 
3     5 (11.4%) 3 (9.4%) 7 (23.3%) 
4     1 (2.3%) 4 (12.5%) 1 (3.3%) 
5     1 (2.3%) 1 (3.1%) 0 
6     0  1 (3.1%) 0 
            
 
This would indicate that malingering forensic patients did not make more 
qualitative errors overall than their non-malingering counterparts.  As such, the focus 
is now shifted to examining group differences in the specific types of qualitative errors 
made.  A breakdown of the number of patients within each group making each of the 
identified types of qualitative errors is provided in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Number of Patients in Comparison Groups Making Each Qualitative Error 
            
Group 
 
Qualitative         DM       PT   NGBRI 
Error      (N=44)   (N=32)  (N=30) p 
            
 
Item Perseveration  8 (18.2%) 6 (18.8%) 3 (10.0%) .566 
Row Perseveration  6 (13.6%) 1 (3.1%) 4 (13.3%) .273 
Roman Numeral  3 (6.8%)a 1 (3.1%)b 7 (23.3%)a b .020 
Capitalization   2 (4.6%)a 7 (21.9%)a 4 (13.3%) .074 
Within Row   14 (31.8%) 11 (34.4%) 9 (30.0%) .933 
Between Row   9 (20.5%) 2 (6.3%) 2 (6.7%) .096 
Row Sequence  7 (15.9%) 7 (21.9%) 10 (33.3%) .211 
Row Extension  2 (4.6%) 1 (3.1%) 2 (6.7%) .804 
Wrong Item   9 (20.5%) 12 (37.5%)a 4 (13.3%)a .066 
Extraneous Element  3 (6.8%) 6 (18.8%) 5 (16.7%) .254 
Embellishment  4 (9.1%) 3 (9.4%) 4 (13.3%) .821 
Reversal   1 (2.3%) 1 (3.1%) 0 (0%)  .645 
Rotation   3 (6.8%) 2 (6.3%) 0 (0%)  .353 
            
 
Note.  a and b denote groups differing from each other at the .05 level of significance  
using Fisher’s Exact Test of Significance.  p represents the overall significance level 
for chi-square. 
 Hypothesis 2. The second study hypothesis was that non-malingering patients 
would make more qualitative errors involving perseveration, misordering of elements, 
character reversals and rotations than malingering patients.  This expectation was 
based upon previous findings of these particular error patterns among the mentally 
retarded and psychiatric patients (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Greiffenstein et al., 1996; 
Morgan, 1991).  This hypothesis was not supported by the present results, as there 
 67
were no significant group differences (using chi-square and Fisher’s Exact Test) for 
errors involving perseveration (Item and Row Perseveration), misordering of elements 
(Within Row, Between Row, and Row Sequence) or rotations and reversals of items 
(Rotation and Reversal).  In fact, it was found that very few non-malingering patients 
made errors involving rotations and reversals, and there was a non-significant trend for 
malingerers to make more errors involving misordering of elements between rows 
(Between Row error) than non-malingering patients.  The most frequently occurring 
error among all groups involved a misordering of items within a row (Within Row 
error). 
Hypothesis 3. In the third hypothesis it was expected that DM patients would 
make more errors involving bizarre and unusual reproductions and addition of 
extraneous elements than PT and NGBRI patients (i.e., Griffin et al., 1996).  Rather, a 
chi-square analysis revealed these groups to be relatively equal in the number of 
Embellishment (p=.821) and Extraneous Element errors (p=.254) (refer back to Table 
13).  In conjunction with the results from the second hypothesis, it would appear that 
malingerers were just as likely to make those errors typically associated with genuine 
psychiatric and intellectual impairment, while non-malingering psychiatric patients 
were just as likely to make those errors believed to be indicative of malingering. 
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis was that malingerers would recall fewer 
items from the first 2 rows of the MFIT, i.e., fail to exhibit a primacy effect in their 
recall.  This was based upon the findings of Morgan (1991), that even individuals with 
severe organic memory problems could recall these items and hence failure to do so 
should suggest malingering.  It was found that DM patients recalled an average of 4.30 
(SD=2.12) items from the first 2 rows, as compared to 5.28 (SD=1.25) for PT patients 
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and 5.27 (SD=1.26) for NGBRI patients.  Using a one-way ANOVA, the overall 
difference between groups was found to be significant (F[2, 103]=4.417, p=.014).  A 
post hoc LSD test revealed that both PT and NGBRI recalled more items than DM  
(p=.013 and .016, respectively), and that PT and NGBRI did not significantly differ in 
their recall of these items (p>.90).  A breakdown of the number of patients in each 
group by the number of items recalled from the first 2 rows is provided below (Table 
14). 
Table 14 
Primacy Effect (Items Recalled from First 2 Rows) by Group Membership 
            
 
Number of Items   DM            PT         NGBRI  
Recalled            (N=44)         (N=32)         (N=30) 
            
 0    5    (11.4) 0    (0)  0    (0) 
 1    1    (13.6) 0    (0)  0    (0) 
 2    1    (15.9) 1    (3.1) 0    (0) 
 3    10  (38.6) 5    (18.8) 6    (20.0) 
 4    2    (43.2) 0    (18.8) 2    (26.7) 
 5    2    (47.7) 4    (31.3) 0    (26.7) 
 6    23  (100) 22  (100) 22  (100) 
            
 
Note. Cumulative percentage in parentheses. 
 
 The majority of all patients recalled more than three items from the first 2 
rows.  Only one non-malingering patient (PT) recalled fewer than three items, 
compared to 7 (15.9%) of the malingerers.  In fact, a closer inspection of the data 
revealed that the PT patient who recalled only two primacy items still had a 
quantitative score above the cutoff, whereas all of the DM patients exhibiting a 
primacy score of two or less fell below the 9-item cutoff.  Furthermore, 60% of the PT 
 69
and 66.7% of the NGBRI patients who had primacy scores of three produced 
quantitative scores above the 9-item cutoff, as compared to only 20% of the 
malingerers who had primacy scores of three.  These findings suggest that failure to 
recall three or more items from the first 2 rows is highly indicative of malingering, 
particularly when combined with failure to recall 9 or more total items.  Furthermore, 
it is noted that failure to recall six items from the first 2 rows resulted in improved 
classification over the total quantitative score for the PT group (specificity of 68.7%), 
whereas the classification (sensitivity) for DM remained unchanged.  This would 
indicate that one would do better by simply calculating primacy scores.  
Before proceeding to the final study hypothesis, it is noted significant between-
groups differences occurred on those qualitative variables (Roman Numeral, 
Capitalization, and Wrong Item) for which there was no a priori hypotheses.  No 
hypotheses were offered for these variables for two reasons.  First, these particular 
errors had only been identified and examined through one previous investigation 
(Griffin et al., 1996), with the resulting conclusion that both reflected “artifacts of 
illness.”  This was because one error (Roman Numeral) was found significantly more 
among normal controls and the other (Wrong Item) significantly more among the 
severely ill.  Consistent with their conclusions, it was found that significantly more 
NGBRI patients made Roman Numeral errors than both PT and DM (Fisher’s Exact 
Test, p < .05), and significantly more PT patients made Wrong Item errors than 
NGBRI (p < .05) (refer to Table 13). 
Second, there appears to be a lack of consensus that the Capitalization error 
should be counted as an actual error.  This was evident in discussions with the two 
raters for this study as well as consultations with four clinical psychologists from 
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forensic settings.  It was found that significantly more PT patients made this error than 
DM patients (Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .05).  Based upon these factors, it was decided 
to recalculate the quantitative scores for all patients to include those items previously 
counted wrong due to a Capitalization error (refer back to Table 2).  Inclusion of these 
items increased the total (quantitative) scores to above the 9-item cutoff for one 
NGBRI, four PT, and no DM patients.  This resulted in improved false positives and 
specificity for both PT (43.8/56.2 to 31.3/68.7) and NGBRI (13.3/86.7 to 10.0/90.0), 
with no change in the sensitivity and false negatives for DM (47.7/52.3).  However, 
the combined false positive and false negative error rates for PT and DM (43.4%) and 
NGBRI and DM (35.1%) still exceeded the established base rate for malingering 
(16%). 
 Hypothesis 5. In the final hypothesis it was predicted that a combination of 
both quantitative and qualitative variables would provide better discrimination 
between malingerers and non-malingerers than the quantitative score alone.  This was 
demonstrated to some extent in the last section, where considering the Primacy Effect 
and total score together strengthened suspicions about malingering and where 
correcting the total score for Capitalization errors resulted in improved classification 
for non-malingerers.  Another method for exploring this hypothesis is through the use 
of linear discriminant analysis (LDA), a statistical procedure that allows one to 
determine the best combination of variables for differentiating between two or more 
groups. 
 The independent (predictor) variables for LDA were derived as follows.  First, 
since the total score yielded better discrimination among groups after being corrected 
for Capitalization errors, the corrected total score was entered as the quantitative 
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variable.  Since Item and Row Perseveration errors are essentially measures of the 
same phenomenon (i.e., repetition), they were combined into a single variable 
(Perseverative errors).  This was also done for Reversal and Rotation errors, as these 
are both errors involving the spatial rotation of items (letters and objects, 
respectively).  Age was entered as an independent variable to control for its effects on 
scores.  The Roman Numeral and Wrong Item errors were omitted from this analysis 
since there were no a priori hypotheses for these variables and they appeared to 
contribute more to differentiation between the two non-malingering groups (i.e., 
“artifacts of illness”).  This resulted in 11 independent variables (Table 15), which fits 
within the recommended criteria for LDA of having 10 subjects per independent 
variable (Pedhazur, 1982).  PT and NGBRI patients were grouped together to form a 
single “non-malingering” (NM) group (N=62), with group status (DM vs. NM) as the 
dependent variable.   
Table 15 
Independent Variables Used in the Linear Discriminant Analysis 
            
   Wilks’  Level of Canonical  
Variable   Lambda Significance Correlation 
             
Corrected Total Score  .868  .000  .636 
Primacy Effect  .952  .024  .366 
Age    .962  .047  .322 
Between Rows  .962  .046            -.323 
Perseveration   .977  .123            -.248 
Row Sequence  .981  .163  .224 
Extraneous Element  .981  .157  .228 
Rotations   .992  .368            -.144 
Embellishment  .999  .728  .056 
Within Row   1.000  .834  .034 
Row Extension  1.000  .835  .033 
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In the initial step of LDA, it was found that the Wilks’ lambda (ratio of the 
within-groups sum of squares to the total sum of squares) for the Corrected Total 
Score, Primacy Effect, Age, and Between Rows error were all significant using 
univariate F-tests (all p’s<.05).  This indicates that the proportion of variance in these 
scores attributable to differences between malingerers and non-malingerers was 
significant.  However, an inspection of the canonical correlations (correlation between 
predictor variable and the resulting discriminant function) revealed that only four of 
the nine predictor variables for which there was an a prior hypothesis went in the 
expected direction.  Specifically, higher scores on those variables with negative 
canonical correlations were more associated with malingering, whereas higher scores 
on variables with positive correlations were associated with non-malingering.  Thus, 
contrary to hypotheses the presence of Between Rows, Perseveration, and 
Rotation errors were associated more with malingering and Extraneous Element and 
Embellishment errors were associated more with non-malingering. 
Next, the discriminative ability of all independent variables (that were not 
linear combinations of the other independent variables) was determined through a 
forced-entry LDA with a minimum entry tolerance criteria of .001.  This method was 
chosen as it allows for the maximum number of variables to be examined, given the 
information provided by a variable about group discrimination has not already been 
supplied by the other variables in the equation (Norusis, 1988).  It was found that all 
of the variables in Table 15 met minimum tolerance criteria and thus were used in the 
analysis.  The resulting Wilks’ lambda for the discriminant function was .726, 
indicating the function accounted for approximately 27.4% of the variance between 
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groups.  This was found to be statistically significant, X2 (11, N=106) = 31.490, 
p=.001, and resulted in 79.2% of all patients being correctly classified (Table 16).   
Table 16 
Classification Results from the Linear Discriminant Analysis Using Forced-Entry 
            
      Actual Group 
Predicted        DM         NM 
Group      (N=44)     (N=62) 
            
 
DM    30 (68.2%)    8 (12.9%) 
 
NM    14 (31.8%)    54 (87.1%) 
            
 
The overall rate for correct classification was substantially improved over that 
obtained through both the quantitative (61.3%) and the (Capitalization) corrected 
quantitative method (66.0%).  A substantial increase was found in sensitivity (47.7 to 
68.2%), and closer inspection of the data revealed that only 5 of the 32 PT patients 
(15.6%) were incorrectly classified. 
 Although this is encouraging, replication is necessary to demonstrate the 
validity and reliability of this method.  Without the benefit of a second sample for 
cross-validation, this was accomplished through the “leave one out” method.  In this 
method, each case in the sample is classified (malingering or non-malingering) using 
the discriminant function that is derived from the entire sample minus that particular 
case.  It was found that the function using all of the variables did not cross-validate 
well, as only 62.3% of the cases were correctly classified (Table 17).  This falls back 
within the range of the quantitative and corrected quantitative methods. 
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Table 17 
Classification Resulting from Cross-Validation of the Forced-Entry LDA 
            
      Actual Group 
Predicted        DM         NM 
Group      (N=44)     (N=62) 
            
 
DM    23 (52.3%)    19 (30.6%) 
 
NM    21 (47.7%)    43 (69.4%) 
            
    
 An alternative approach was to use only those independent variables making 
the largest (and statistically significant) contribution to differentiating the two groups.  
This was done through an LDA using a stepwise entry method, with minimization of 
Wilks’ lambda as the entry criterion.  This resulted in a Wilks’ lambda of .748 for the 
overall function, which was significant, X2 (4, N=106) = 29.637, p=.000, and 
accounted for 25.2% of the variance between groups.  Only four variables were 
retained for the function, which in order of the size of their pooled within-groups 
correlation with the discriminant function were the total corrected score, Between 
Rows error, age, and Extraneous Element.  The only variable with a negative 
canonical discrimination function coefficient (thus higher scores associated with 
malingering) was the Between Rows error. 
 Use of this method resulted in 72.6% of the original cases being classified 
correctly (56.8% of malingerers and 83.9% of non-malingerers) (Table 18).  More 
importantly, these results cross-validated when using the leave one out procedure, with 
71.7% of the cases still being correctly classified.  It was noted that only one patient 
(NM) was re-classified incorrectly. 
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Table 18 
Classification Table for the Stepwise LDA and Cross-Validation 
            
      Actual Group 
Predicted   DM     NM 
Group            (N=44)              (N=62) 
            
 
DM   25 (56.8%)   25 (56.8%)  10 (16.1%)   11 (17.7%) 
 
NM   19 (43.2%)   19 (43.2%)  52 (83.9%)   51 (82.3%) 
            
 
Note.  Numbers in italicized print represent cross-validated classifications. 
 The combined use of quantitative and qualitative scores resulted in improved 
classification, particularly for the two groups of greater clinical relevance (PT and 
DM).  Although this method met statistical criteria for validity (.568/.432 > .177/.823), 
the combined error rate (27.4 %) remained above the estimated base rate for 
malingering (16%).  Thus, the combined method did not make the MFIT better than 
base rate prediction alone. 
Supplemental Analyses 
 Psychiatric Symptoms. The BPRS-E (Ventura et al., 1993) was given to all 
NGBRI participants to obtain ratings of psychiatric symptoms.  Since none of the PT 
patients had been given this measure during hospitalization, symptom analyses were 
restricted to those patients in the NGBRI group (N=30).  A series of one-tailed 
Pearson correlations were calculated between BPRS-E items and the MFIT scoring 
indices.  It was found that only three symptoms had a moderate and significant 
correlation with total MFIT (quantitative) scores, and all three were psychotic 
symptoms that can affect the ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive 
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processes.  These symptoms were hallucinations (r = -.422, p = .01), disorientation (r= 
-.428, p=.009), and conceptual disorganization (r = -.468, p=.005). 
 The only psychiatric symptoms significantly correlated with the total number 
of qualitative errors were elevated mood (r=.429, p=.009) and flattened affect (r=.375, 
p=.021).  Only one qualitative error (Wrong Item) was significantly associated with 
psychiatric symptoms, those being hallucinations (r=.552), disorientation (r=.587), and 
conceptual disorganization (r=.413) (all p’s < .01), which appears to be consistent with 
the speculations of Griffin et al. (1996) regarding “artifact of illness.”  However, little 
can be made of this or any other of these findings (or lack thereof) between the 
individual qualitative errors and psychiatric symptoms, given the low number of 
patients making these errors (i.e., less than one-third; refer back to Table 13).  
Nonetheless, these results seem to indicate that psychotic symptoms which affect 
one’s ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive processes contribute to 
lower MFIT recall. 
Intelligence. Low intelligence has been significantly associated with decreased 
MFIT recall (e.g., Hays et al., 1993).  Fortunately, IQ estimates were available for 31 
of the PT patients in this study.  Looking back to Table 4, a larger proportion of PT 
patients had been diagnosed with either mental retardation or borderline intellectual 
functioning as compared to the NGBRI sample.  A closer inspection reveals that it was 
predominately these PT patients (10 out of 14, 71.4%) who had been incorrectly 
classified based upon their quantitative scores.  These diagnoses were confirmed 
through the finding that the average IQ for PT patients was 70.06 (SD=7.97, range = 
54 to 84), falling just on the border of mild mental retardation.  A one-way ANOVA 
revealed the average IQ for these patients to be significantly lower than that for 
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NGBRI patients (p=.016), who had an average IQ in the borderline range (M=75.17, 
SD=8.03, range = 55 to 91).  Not surprisingly, the average IQ for DM patients (N=35) 
was well within the mental retardation range (M=63.26, SD=8.33, range = 36 to 80), a 
finding which supports the notion these patients were malingering problems with 
intelligence as well as psychosis. 
Consistent with the findings from previous investigations, there was a 
significant positive one-tailed correlation between IQ and total MFIT scores for both 
PT (r=.390, p=.015) and NGBRI patients (r=.356, p=.027).  A significant positive 
correlation was also found between IQ and the Primacy Effect for both PT (r=.362, 
p=.023) and NGBRI patients (r=.313, p=.046).  Contrary to the findings of Griffin et 
al. (1996), there were no significant correlations for either patient group between IQ 
and the total number of qualitative error types or the total number of qualitative errors 
(all p’s>.10).  Although a closer inspection of the relationships between IQ and the 
individual qualitative errors was again hampered by the low number of patients 
making individual errors, it was noticed there were no significant correlations between 
any of these variables for the combined patient sample. 
Age. Previous investigations (e.g., Griffin et al., 1996; Hays et al., 1993) 
reported an inverse correlation between age and total MFIT scores as well as 
qualitative errors.  In the previous section it was found that age provided important 
information for group discrimination (i.e., increasing age associated with non-
malingering status).  Consistent with previous findings, age was found to be 
significantly and inversely correlated with total MFIT scores for both PT (r= -.350, 
p=.025) and DM patients (r= -.269, p=.038), though not for NGBRI (p>.150).  There 
were no significant correlations for any group between age and any of the qualitative 
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indices.  These findings seem to indicate that the primary effect of age is on recall per 
se, an effect that may be magnified by the level of psychiatric impairment. 
Incentive to Malinger. Finally, it was mentioned that individuals having more 
at stake (e.g., facing severe punishment) would be more likely to engage in extreme 
presentations and “overplay the role” (Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Schacter, 1986a).  It 
would therefore seem plausible that individuals facing larger prison sentences (or 
capitol punishment) would be apt to perform more poorly on the MFIT, in turn 
providing a contextual variable for interpreting results.  Rather, there was not found a 
significant correlation between maximum possible sentence and total MFIT items 
recalled for patients who had been diagnosed as malingering (r= -.107, p=.244).  This 
would indicate the need to exercise caution when interpreting results within a given 
context without considering other sources of information (e.g., behavioral 
observations). 
 79
Discussion 
Since 1986, several investigations have established normative data for the 
MFIT among various patient populations displaying memory problems (e.g., 
neurological disorders, patients recovering from head injury, psychiatric patients, 
patients with mental retardation) (Back et al., 1996; Bernard & Fowler, 1990; 
Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Hays et al., 1993; Morgan, 1991). There have also been a 
series of investigations using simulation (e.g., Arnett et al., 1995; Bernard, 1990; 
Bernard et al., 1993; Guilmette et al., 1994; Schretlen et al., 1991), differential 
prevalence (Griffin et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1992), and known-groups designs 
(Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995; Simon, 1994).  The general consensus 
has been that the MFIT is overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment (e.g., 
Schretlen et al., 1991), and the results of simulation and differential prevalence design 
studies have indicated low sensitivity to simulated or suspected malingering of 
memory problems. 
A closer inspection of available data revealed this conclusion to be premature.  
Lezak’s (1976) original contention was that only “significantly deteriorated” patients 
would have difficulty in recalling nine or more items.  This was supported by the 
finding that patients with intracerebral hemorrhage, injuries resulting in severe global 
cognitive impairment, or severe organic amnesia had the poorest recall on the MFIT.  
Specificity among patients with neurological conditions was estimated to be 
approximately 85.8% (combined data from Arnett et al., 1995; Bernard & Fowler, 
1988; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1992; Millis & Kler, 1995; Morgan, 1991).  
When a more sound study design was used (known-groups), the overall sensitivity 
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among civil litigants seeking disability or financial compensation for injuries was 64% 
(Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995). 
These discoveries offer better support for use of the MFIT as a floor effect 
screening measure for malingered memory problems.  However, there has been a 
paucity of research with the MFIT among pretrial criminal defendants, a population 
noted to malinger problems with memory and intellect in addition to psychosis (e.g., 
Gothard et al., 1995).  Only two studies have been conducted so far; both were noted 
to have restricted sample sizes and only one (Simon, 1994) provided estimates of 
sensitivity and specificity.  Furthermore, several MFIT investigations (Arnett et al., 
1995; Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Griffin et al., 1996; Guilmette et al., 1994; Morgan, 
1991; Schretlen et al., 1991) indicated that a qualitative scoring approach (magnitude 
of errors strategy; Rogers et al., 1993) might increase the detection ability of the 
measure.  However, only one study has systematically investigated this approach 
(Griffin et al., 1996), and was limited through use of a design of questionable 
ecological validity (differential prevalence). 
The present known-groups study examined the validity and effectiveness of 
both the traditional (quantitative) and qualitative scoring methods for the MFIT among 
a larger sample of criminal forensic inpatients.  This was done through examining the 
MFIT protocols (administered under normal clinical conditions) from an archival 
sample of pretrial criminal defendants independently diagnosed as malingering, and an 
archival sample of pretrial criminal defendants for whom malingering had not been 
suspected and subsequently ruled out.  Since NGBRI status is the goal of the pretrial 
malingerer, MFIT protocols were also collected from a sample of NGBRI patients for 
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purposes of comparison.  The results of the scoring methods were examined within the 
context of five study hypotheses, summarized as follows. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis dealt with the traditional quantitative scoring method (9-
item cutoff), and it was predicted that malingering patients would recall fewer total 
items than non-malingering patients.  As expected, the average number of items 
recalled by DM patients fell below the 9-item cutoff whereas the average number for 
the non-malingering PT and NGBRI patients fell above the cutoff.  It was also found 
that NGBRI patients recalled significantly more items than DM patients.  However, 
only partial support was gained as no significant differences were found between DM 
and PT in the total scores, and the average total score of the NGBRI group was 
significantly greater than that for PT.  This raises concern, as the two non-malingering 
groups exhibited significantly different scores and the two groups most likely to 
receive the MFIT in criminal forensic settings (PT and DM) did not. 
Several explanations can be offered for the significantly different quantitative 
scores of the PT and NGBRI groups.  The first is that the archival nature of the PT 
group’s data and their pretrial status (i.e., incentive to malinger) would make it 
difficult to rule out the presence of malingerers.  However, close inspection of hospital 
staffs’ behavioral observations of these patients in conjunction with the results of other 
psychological (malingering) assessment would indicate this is not so. 
A second explanation would be that differences in the severity of psychiatric 
symptoms between the two groups contributed to differential performance.  PT 
patients were typically admitted (and tested) during an acute phase of illness, whereas 
NGBRI patients had been hospitalized and treated for a longer time period.  In fact, an 
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inspection of available records indicated that 40.6% of the PT patients had not yet 
received pharmacological treatment when they were assessed.  By comparison, only 
two NGBRI patients were on no medications, and all had been hospitalized for 10 
months or more.  Furthermore, it had been noted that several of the PT patients had 
been determined by staff to be experiencing a first episode of psychosis, one typically 
characterized by disorganization.  Together these findings indicate that PT patients 
had a more acute and severe symptom status.  This is relevant, given that higher levels 
of conceptual disorganization, disorientation, and hallucinations were significantly 
associated with lower total scores among NGBRI participants.  However, no firm 
conclusions can be reached at this time since no psychiatric symptom ratings were 
available for PT patients  
A third and readily identified explanation is the contribution of lower 
intelligence in the performance of the PT group.  Several investigations reported 
significant correlations between IQ and MFIT total scores (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; 
Hays et al., 1993; Simon, 1994), with the lowest reported specificity among 
individuals with both low IQ and (unspecified) psychiatric disturbance (Hays et al., 
1993).  Not surprisingly, the average IQ for PT patients (70.6) was significantly lower 
than that for NGBRI patients (75.2), and IQ was significantly correlated with the total 
score for both groups.  Furthermore, closer inspection of the PT patients falling below 
the 9-item cutoff revealed that 57.1% had been diagnosed with mental retardation and 
14.3% with borderline intellectual functioning.  This occurred in conjunction with an 
Axis I diagnoses of schizophrenia, major depression, or some form of substance-
induced cognitive disorder (dementia).  It follows that the specificity for the PT group 
(56.2%) fell between that for individuals with mental retardation (62.5%; Goldberg & 
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Miller, 1986) and patients with various psychiatric problems and moderate to mild 
mental retardation (32.4%; Hays et al., 1993). 
Although there was a trend for PT patients to obtain higher total scores than 
DM patients, this was not significant by conventional standards.  This is important, as 
these are the two groups to be differentiated under clinical conditions.  The most likely 
explanation for this finding can be found by way of comparison with the criminal 
forensic MFIT study of Simon (1994).  In Simon’s study, 85.7% of the diagnosed 
malingerers fell below the 9-item cutoff, compared to only 47.7% of the diagnosed 
malingerers in this study.  Considering this with the assumption that malingering most 
likely lies on a continuum (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Resnick, 1993), it comes as no 
surprise that Simon reported the malingerers in his study to be rather extreme in their 
presentations.  These discrepant rates of sensitivity raise the possibility that the 
severity of malingering in the current sample was more varied, an assumption 
supported by two findings.  First, the behavioral observations of staff and the results of 
malingering assessment for the DM group (Tables 5 to 7) indicate that several 
individuals were less blatant in their efforts (i.e., exaggerating versus feigning).  
Second, 13 DM patients had an established preexisting condition of psychosis, an 
experience base that could potentially be used to develop a more sophisticated 
presentation style (e.g., Pachana et al., 1998).  Consistent with this notion, only one 
DM patient with a preexisting psychosis fell below the cutoff, and even then by only a 
single point. 
As noted by Rogers and Cruise (1998), the assumption underlying a floor 
effect measure is that the malingerer will “overplay” the role.  Such an assumption 
would necessarily limit the utility of the measure among individuals engaging in less 
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extreme presentations, which seems to be supported by the present findings.  
However, it would also indicate better utility in identifying those being more blatant in 
their efforts.  A closer inspection of the data in Table 11 reveals that only one non-
malingering (NGBRI) patient had a quantitative score of less than 5, this was an 
individual with an established history of both psychosis and moderate mental 
retardation (tested IQ of 55).  Only two non-malingering patients obtained a total score 
of 5, and both had IQ’s in the lower end of the mild mental retardation range (less than 
65).  In comparison, 12 (27.3%) of the DM patients had total scores of 5 or less, seven 
of these had scores of 2 and 3.  
In conclusion, one can be fairly confident in correctly identifying malingering 
when very low MFIT scores (< 5) are obtained.  Otherwise, there is sufficient 
evidence that the traditional scoring method for the MFIT lacks specificity to the 
combined influences of lower intelligence and psychiatric symptoms affecting the 
ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive processes.  This method also 
lacks sensitivity to less extreme or more sophisticated forms of malingering.  
Together, these findings provide argument to examine alternative scoring methods, 
preferably those less affected by IQ and symptom status.  This was examined in the 
remaining hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2   
 Several investigators (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Greiffenstein et al., 1996; 
Morgan, 1991; Schretlen et al., 1991) observed qualitative errors involving 
perseveration, rotation, reversal, and misordering of items in the MFIT recall of 
patients with low IQ, primarily mental retardation.  Given the presence of individuals 
experiencing problems with both psychosis and low IQ in criminal forensic settings 
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(e.g., Hayes et al., 1997), it was hypothesized these types of errors would be observed 
to a greater extent among the non-malingering patients.  This hypothesis was not 
supported, as no significant between-groups differences were found for Item and Row 
Perseveration, Rotation, Reversal, Within Row, Between Row, and Row Sequence 
errors.  In fact, only three non-malingering patients made a reversal or rotation error, 
and no significant correlations were found between IQ and these qualitative errors.  
Given the average IQ for non-malingerers fell in the lower end of the borderline range, 
this lack of significant findings is both unexpected and inconsistent with previous 
investigations.  While the current study design did not permit examination of this 
issue, these results might suggest that the diminished cognitive functioning attributable 
to (or in conjunction with) psychosis is qualitatively different from that due to other 
organic factors. 
There was observed an increased rate of errors involving perseveration and 
misordering of elements among malingerers.  Although there was a non-significant 
trend for malingerers to make more Between Rows errors, it was later determined that 
the proportion of variance in this score attributable to differences between malingerers 
and non-malingerers was significant.  While this is opposite of expectations, in 
retrospect it is not surprising.  The MFIT was designed to facilitate recall through the 
grouping of related items (e.g., geometric shapes, first three letters of alphabet).  The 
misordering of elements within a row (Within Row error) was the most frequently 
observed of all errors (one third of all groups), and it was observed this typically 
involved misordering of the geometric shapes.  This is expected, as there is no 
“natural” order for these items (in contrast to “A B C”).  However, placing together 
unlike items (e.g., A 3 O) would not be expected, except perhaps in cases involving 
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pronounced disorganization.  The presence of this particular misordering error 
therefore appears to be more indicative of malingering. 
Last, the presence of “non-malingering” errors among the DM might be 
explained by the presence of individuals with preexisting psychosis and low IQ.  
However, a closer inspection of the data revealed that only 3 or less of the 13 patients 
with an established preexisting condition made each of these specific types of errors.  
Rather, the results indicate these qualitative errors (with the exception of Between 
Rows) lack the ability to differentiate between malingering and non-malingering 
criminal forensic inpatients, at least when considered in isolation. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis concerned the types of errors expected of malingerers.  
On the basis of previous findings (Benton & Spreen, 1961; Griffin et al., 1996; 
Guilmette et al., 1994), it was expected that DM would make more errors involving 
bizarre and unusual reproductions (Embellishment) and addition of extraneous 
elements than non-malingering patients.  This would seem logical from a malingering 
standpoint, as someone desiring to appear “insane” might accomplish this through 
making “bizarre” errors.  To the contrary, it was found that non-malingerers were just 
as likely to make these types of errors as malingerers, and the canonical correlation for 
these variables indicated a greater (although non-significant) association with non-
malingering status. 
One possible explanation is that the bizarre reproductions among non-
malingerers reflects the bizarre or unusual thinking often seen in schizophrenia (APA, 
1994).  However, the small proportion of non-malingerers making these errors 
prohibited further statistical analysis of their association with specific symptoms.  A 
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second and more likely explanation is that the hypothesis was predicated on findings 
derived from studies of questionable ecological validity (i.e., simulation and 
differential prevalence designs) (Rogers & Cruise, 1998).  Nonetheless, these errors 
did not significantly differentiate malingerers from non-malingerers. 
Hypothesis 4 
Morgan (1991) observed that a high percentage of patient with severe to 
profound memory problems could recall the first 2 rows of the MFIT, i.e., exhibit a 
primacy effect in their recall.  Although this was not examined in a malingering 
context, Morgan speculated that failure to exhibit a primacy effect might be indicative 
of malingering.  This was the fourth hypothesis, that non-malingerers would exhibit 
more of a primacy effect in their recall compared to malingerers.  Consistent with 
expectations, it was found that both PT and NGBRI patients recalled significantly 
more items from the first 2 rows than DM patients.  Furthermore, no significant 
differences were found between the two non-malingering groups. 
Additional important findings were made.  First, failure to recall at least 3 of 
the 6 primacy items was highly indicative of malingering (only one non-malingering 
patient fell in this range).  Scores of 3 were also more common among malingerers, 
although confidence in correct identification was increased when the total quantitative 
score fell below the 9-item cutoff.  Second, using a cutoff of less than 6 primacy items 
resulted in improved specificity over the traditional scoring for PT patients (56.2 to 
68.7%) while leaving sensitivity unchanged.  Last, although lower primacy scores 
were associated with lower IQ, there were no significant correlations between this 
score and any of the 24 psychiatric symptoms assessed.  That this score was 
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unaffected by symptom status makes it a more desirable alternative to the quantitative 
score. 
An interesting aspect of the finding of a primacy effect is one would expect to 
see a recency effect in the short-term recall of individuals with memory problems (i.e., 
Wiggins & Brandt, 1988).  A possible explanation lies in the finding that individuals 
with severe psychiatric disturbance have diminished processing speed (e.g., Malloy & 
Duffy, 1994; Malloy & Richardson, 1994).  The allotted MFIT exposure time (10 
seconds) may therefore be inadequate for these patients, in essence they only recall 
what they have had time to scan (i.e., first 2 rows).  This would explain why the 
quantitative score was affected by those symptoms reflecting or contributing to 
impaired cognitive processing, whereas the primacy score was not.  It is therefore 
suggested that future investigations consider varying the length of exposure time for 
these patients, in particular those who are acutely ill, as this may result in improved 
specificity.  It is also suggested that greater emphasis be placed on primacy scores. 
Hypothesis 5 
 Last, it was hypothesized that a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
scoring methods would provide better discrimination between malingerers and non-
malingerers.  This was supported through three findings.  First, as discussed in the 
fourth hypothesis, quantitative scores falling below the cutoff in conjunction with 
lower primacy scores were found to be more indicative of malingering.  Second, given 
the uncertainty that the Capitalization error should be counted as an error, quantitative 
scores were recalculated correcting for the presence of this error.  This resulted in 
improved specificity for non-malingerers, in particular the PT patients (56.2 to 
68.7%).  Specificity for NGBRI patients increased marginally (86.7 to 90.0%), while 
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sensitivity was left unchanged (i.e., none of the DM falling below the cutoff made this 
type of error). 
The third method through which this was examined was a linear discriminant 
analysis involving both quantitative and qualitative variables.  Only those variables 
accounting for the largest proportion of variance between malingerers and non-
malingerers (total Capitalization-corrected score, between rows error, and extraneous 
element) were used, controlling for the effects of age.  Overall correct classification 
rose from 61.3% for the quantitative method to 72.6%, and was maintained upon 
cross-validation within the same sample (71.7%).  Although specificity was at an 
acceptable level (83.9%), there was only a small increase in sensitivity (47.7 to 
56.8%).  These results indicated that higher total scores (Capitalization corrected) and 
extraneous elements were more indicative of non-malingering status, whereas lower 
total scores and between rows errors were more associated with malingering. 
A problem with incorporating the qualitative scoring method was that, despite 
a high base rate for errors per se, less than one third of any group made any one 
particular type of error.  Such a low base rate for errors necessarily limits their 
usefulness in discriminating between groups.  This is similar to Griffin et al.’s (1996) 
finding of a low base rate for qualitative errors, from which it had been concluded that 
the presence of any “malingering” error be taken as evidence of feigning.  The current 
results do not support this recommendation, as malingerers were just as likely overall 
to make those errors typically associated with genuine impairment while actual 
patients were just as likely to make those errors Griffin et al. believed to be indicative 
of malingering.  Rather, these results suggest that the presence of between rows errors 
 90
and extraneous elements need to be taken in consideration when interpreting total 
MFIT scores in attempts to identify malingerers in criminal forensic inpatient settings. 
Validity and Effectiveness 
To summarize, 47.7% of diagnosed malingerers were correctly identified when 
using the traditional scoring method.  This figure slightly increased to 56.8% when 
qualitative errors were incorporated.  This is substantially less than the 85.7% 
sensitivity among blatant pretrial malingerers (Simon, 1994) and just below the 
estimated sensitivity of 64% for civil litigants.  However, this was well above the 
overall sensitivity computed from studies using simulation (37.5%) and differential 
prevalence designs (22.4%). 
In terms of specificity, 86.7% of NGBRI patients were correctly identified 
through their MFIT scores.  This was almost identical to that for Simon’s (1994) 
NGBRI control group (85.7%) and a sample of patients with schizophrenia (87%; 
Back et al., 1996).  In comparison, only 56.2% of the non-malingering pretrial patients 
were correctly identified, although this number increased substantially (to 
approximately 80%) through incorporation of qualitative scoring.  Incorporating 
qualitative scoring produced only a marginal increase for the NGBRI participants 
(90%). 
The practical implication of these findings can be determined through 
computations of validity and effectiveness for the various approaches.  The traditional 
scoring method was found to be valid for differentiating both groups of non-
malingerers from malingerers.  This was also found to be the case when using the 
Capitalization-corrected total score and the combined quantitative and qualitative 
procedure derived through LDA.  However, the traditional scoring procedure was not 
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more accurate than utilizing base rate prediction alone in this regard, given the high 
combined error rates for PT and DM patients (48.7%).  This leaves a base rate 
effectiveness range of approximately 49 to 51%, a number far in excess of the 
estimated 16% base rate for malingering among criminal defendants (Rogers et al., 
1998).  In comparison, combining the quantitative and qualitative methods produced a 
lower combined error rate of 27.4%, yielding a base rate effectiveness range of 28 to 
72%.  Although this is still above the estimated base rate, it is only slightly above the 
highest reported base rate of 25% for all forms of malingering (exaggeration to blatant 
fabrication) within criminal forensic settings (Rogers, 1986). 
 Before making final conclusions about the effectiveness of the combined 
approach, certain limitations need to be noted.  First, the malingering base rate 
estimate that was used (16%) was derived from a survey of over 500 experienced 
forensic clinicians (Rogers et al., 1998).  While such a large number of professional 
opinions would seem valid, the lack of objective diagnostic criteria for malingering 
combined with a failure to use objective measures undermines the validity of this 
estimate.  This restricts the conclusions that can be reached on the effectiveness of the 
MFIT, or any other malingering measure, among criminal forensic populations.  In the 
least, it provides argument for objectively determining local base rates. 
Second, the effectiveness equation does not take into account possible 
measurement error in the determination of the combined error rate.  Specifically, the 
interval of confidence surrounding the estimated false positive and false negative rates 
needs to be weighed when deciding if a measure is effective.  While this is less of a 
concern when the base rate and error rates are widely disparate, it becomes 
problematic when the differences are minimal (as in the combined scoring approach).  
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Such situations provide argument for cross-validating results before reaching any firm 
conclusions about effectiveness. 
Last, this study largely relied upon data from archival records.  The time span 
covered by this study (one decade) was considerable, and a number of professionals 
were involved in making observations and assessments during this time.  There were 
also variations in backgrounds and training that could not be accounted for.  These 
factors make it difficult to determine to what extent, if any, that observations, 
diagnoses, and administration of assessments were done in a completely reliable 
fashion.  Although this loss of experimental control has been a noted problem with 
known-groups designs in malingering research (Rogers et al., 1993), it has been 
considered an acceptable tradeoff given the potential gains in ecological validity (as 
compared to simulation and differential prevalence designs). 
Final Conclusions 
 To summarize, the final conclusions are offered for use of the MFIT in 
criminal forensic settings: 
1. The current results indicate the MFIT is accurate at identifying malingerers within 
criminal forensic settings.  Although it is not more accurate than the base rate at 
achieving this goal, incorporating specific errors (between rows and extraneous 
elements) with the total score can increase correct classification, mainly that for 
actual patients.  The large Type II error therefore necessitates the use of additional 
malingering measures.  However, it should be noted that use of base rate 
predictions alone would not result in identification of any malingerers, as well 
multiple indices are used in making this determination. 
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2. The lack of effectiveness of the MFIT with this population can be attributed to 
three factors.  First, the low estimated base rate for malingering leaves little room 
for error on any given measure.  Second, the combined effects of hallucinations, 
disorientation, conceptual disorganization, and lowered intelligence results in 
increased false positives.  Third, sensitivity for this measure is decreased 
substantially when dealing with malingerers who are less blatant or more 
sophisticated in their presentations. 
3. Capitalization errors should not be counted against the total MFIT score, as this 
reduces the amount of Type I error. 
4. One can be more confident in correctly identifying malingering when a) very low 
total scores (< 5) are obtained and b) there is a failure to recall at least three items 
from the first 2 rows, particularly when total scores fall below the traditional 
cutoff. 
5. It has been noted that certain psychiatric symptoms (i.e., disorganized speech) are 
difficult to malinger for extended periods of time (Resnick, 1993).  Given the 
association between this symptom and lower MFIT performance, it is 
recommended that lengthy behavioral observations be conducted before 
interpreting low MFIT scores.  Likewise, the impact of low IQ on MFIT scores 
argues for the importance of determining premorbid intellectual functioning (e.g., 
failure to meet developmental milestones, school records indicating severe 
learning problems) before making clinical decisions. 
6. Future MFIT research would benefit from a) obtaining psychiatric symptom 
ratings for pretrial non-malingerers and b) examining the effects of increased 
administration time on classification rates.  Future malingering research would 
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likewise benefit from identifying or developing neurocognitive malingering 
assessments that are relatively impervious to the effects of low IQ and psychiatric 
illness. 
7. Last, the current results indicate the MFIT has utility as a screening (rather than 
diagnostic) measure for malingering within criminal forensic settings, particularly 
when dealing with more blatant forms of deception. 
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Appendix A 
The Rey 15-Item Memory Test 
 
 
A  B  C 
1  2  3 
a  b  c 
       
 I  II  III 
 
 
 
 
 101
Appendix B 
 
The Negative Impression Management Scale 
Please read each statement and decide if it is an accurate statement about you.  Use the 
following scale to rate each item: 
0 = False, not at all true 
1 = Slightly true 
2 = Mainly true 
3 = Very true 
 
____ 1.  Sometimes I cannot remember who I am. 
____ 2.  I have visions in which I see myself forced to commit crimes. 
____ 3.  Since the day I was born I was destined to be unhappy. 
____ 4.  I have three or four completely different personalities inside of me. 
____ 5.  People don’t understand how much I suffer. 
____ 6.  Every once in a while I totally lose my memory. 
____ 7.  Sometimes my vision is only in black and white. 
____ 8.  I don’t have any good memories from my childhood. 
____ 9.  I have severe psychological problems that begin very suddenly. 
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Appendix C 
 
The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 
 
Name/ID #      Date     Rater    
Hospital/Location      Period of assessment    
 
    NA             1           2       3       4                5             6            7 
Not assessed   Not Present       Very Mild     Mild    Moderate     Moderately  Severe     Severe   Ext. Severe 
 
Rate items 1-14 on the basis of patient’s self-report during interview.  Mark ‘‘NA’’ for symptoms 
not assessed.  Note items 7, 12, and 13 are also rated on observed behavior during the interview.  
PROVIDE EXAMPLES. 
 
1. Somatic Concern   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
2. Anxiety    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
3. Depression    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
4. Suicidality    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
5. Guilt     NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
6. Hostility    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
7. Elevated Mood   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
8. Grandiosity    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
9.  Suspiciousness   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
10. Hallucinations   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
11. Unusual Thought Content  NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
12. Bizarre Behavior   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
13. Self-neglect    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
14. Disorientation   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
Rate items 15-24 on the basis of observed behavior or speech of the patient during the interview. 
 
15. Conceptual Disorganization NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
16. Blunted Affect   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
17. Emotional Withdrawal  NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
18. Motor Retardation   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
19. Tension    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
20. Uncooperativeness   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
21. Excitement    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
22. Distractibility    NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
23. Motor Hyperactivity   NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
24. Mannerisms and Posturing  NA     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
Sources of information Explain here if validity of assessment is questionable 
 
_____ Patient     _____ Symptoms possibly drug-induced 
_____ Parents/Relatives    _____ Underreported due to lack of rapport 
_____ Mental Health Professionals   _____ Underreported due to negative symptoms 
_____ Chart     _____ Patient uncooperative 
_____ Difficult to assess due to formal thought  
         disorder 
     _____ Other _______________________________________ 
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Appendix D 
Demographics Form 
 
Study #  __________  Years of Education __________ 
Age   __________  Legal Status  __________ 
Race   __________ 
Charge(s)  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Maximum possible sentence:______________________________________________ 
# prior arrests:  _________  Felony ________ # convictions 
   _________  Misdem ________ # convictions 
   _________  City ________ # convictions 
Diagnosis: 
AxisI_______________________________________________________________ 
Axis II: _____________________________________________________________ 
Axis III: ____________________________________________________________ 
h/o head injury w/ LOC? 
documented h/o neurological condition (include source and results of CT/MRI/EEG)? 
 
h/o seizure disorder?  (include treatments, last documented seizure) 
 
prior diagnosis of malingering? (state by whom) 
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Previous suspicion of malingering? (state by whom and what reasons/evidence) 
 
Provide any documented h/o mental retardation (give IQ when available, source): 
 
Provide any documented h/o mental illness (include diagnoses, treatments, duration, 
source) 
 
# of prior hospitalizations: 
TEST DATA: 
FSIQ: ___________  circle one    WAIS-R    WAIS-III     SILS      RSPM       
4-subtest WAIS-R 
Referred for malingering evaluation? 
 
If yes, was it for psychosis, cognitive (including memory) or both? 
 
Behavioral observations by tx. team or psychologist: 
 
Was malingering confirmed through other tests? 
 
What were they malingering? 
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Other tests given: 
 
____  SIRS _____ total scales in definite range ( RS  SC  IA  BL  SU  SEL  SEV 
RO) 
____ total scales in probable range ( RS  SC  IA  BL  SU  SEL  SEV  
RO) 
___ total scales in indefinite range ( RS  SC  IA  BL  SU  SEL  SEV  
RO) 
  _______ probability of malingering 
 
______ M Test ______  total C items ______  total S items  
______  total M items 
 
_____  Dot Counting  ______  time for ungrouped 
    ______  time for grouped 
    ______  total number of ungrouped correct 
    ______  total number of grouped correct 
_____  Digit Memory  ______  level of performance 
 
Other confirming sources of malingering (e.g., improbably poor performance on 
neuropsych tests, MMPI or PAI scales, etc.): 
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Appendix E 
Consent Form 
 
1. Title: Qualitative Scoring of the Rey 15-Item Memory Test in a Forensic 
Population. 
 
2. Where: Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic Division. 
 
3. Contacts: If you have any questions, you may contact the following individuals 
Monday through Friday between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
 
Dr. David Hale     James Martin 
ELMHS Forensic Division   ELMHS Forensic Division 
Ph. (225) 634-2661 ext. 65   Ph. (225) 634-2661 ext. 72 
 
4. Purpose of the Study: This is a research study which will look at the different types 
of errors that are made by patients in a forensic hospital on the Rey 15-Item 
Memory Test. We want to see if patients who are not malingering make different 
types of errors than patients who are suspected of malingering. 
 
5. Participants: This study is open to all people who have been found “Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity” and committed by the courts to the Forensic Division.  People 
who are currently experiencing severe psychological problems, who have been 
found to be exaggerating their psychological and intellectual problems, or who 
have a history of severe brain injury will be unable to participate. 
 
6. Number of Participants: 30 patients at the Forensic Division will be enrolled in this 
study. 
 
7. Procedures: This study will only use those tests which are normally used at the 
Forensic Division.  You will first be asked to complete a short test of your 
memory.  Then you will be asked about any psychological problems you may or 
may not have, such as feeling nervous, sad, or hearing voices.  Last, you will be 
asked to complete some tests which ask you true or false questions, questions 
about how you generally see yourself, and tests which ask you to count dots and 
solve problems.  The whole study will only take one hour of your time. 
 
8. Benefits:  You will receive $2.00 for completing the entire study. The other benefit 
is you will be helping us understand if using a different scoring method makes a 
test more useful for forensic patients. 
 
9. Risks:  There are no risks for doing this study.  However, if you should feel 
uncomfortable you can refuse to answer questions or stop the study at any time. 
 
10. Right to Refuse: You do not have to do this study if you do not want to.  You can 
also stop doing the study at any time.  If you decide not to do the study or decide 
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to stop the study, your decision will not affect your treatment at this facility or get 
you in trouble with the staff.  You will not be punished in any way or lose points 
on the Level system. 
 
11. Privacy: The information we get from you will only be used for this study, and is 
not to be used by the courts or for your treatment at Forensic Division.  This is an 
anonymous study, which means your name will not be placed on any forms except 
the consent form, and this is to be kept in a different file.  That way, no one will 
know who you are or how you did on these tests.  Only the people listed above 
will be able to look at your answers.  After the study, we will destroy all of these 
forms, so no one will know you did the study. 
 
12. Financial Information: You will paid two (2) dollars upon completion of the entire 
study.  This money will be deposited directly to your patient account. 
 
13. Alternatives: The alternative is not to participate in this study. 
 
14. Withdrawal: Since your participation in this study is voluntary, you have the right 
to stop at any time.  This will not affect your treatment at Forensic Division or 
place on the Level system.  However, only those people who complete the entire 
study will be paid the two dollars. 
 
15. Removal: Participants who become disruptive, aggressive, or very psychotic 
during the study will be removed from the study. 
 
16. Signatures: The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been 
answered.  I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the 
investigators.  If I have questions about subjects’ rights or other concerns, I can 
contact Charles E. Graham, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225) 
388-8692.  I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the 
researcher’s obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by 
me. 
 
 
Signature of the Patient Volunteer     Date 
 
“The study subject has indicated to me that he is unable to read.  I certify that I have 
read this consent form to the subject and explained that by completing the signature 
line above, the subject has agreed to participate.” 
 
 
Signature of Reader       Date 
 
 
Signature of Witness       Date 
 
 
Signature of Investigator      Date 
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